United States v. Dimas Yuman-Parada

── United States v. Dimas Yuman-Parada ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Date: April 24, 2026 Category: NEW USCA11 Case: 25-11426 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 04/24/2026 Page: 1 of 4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11426 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DIMAS OBISPO YUMAN-PARADA, a.k.a. Dimas Obispo Yuman, a.k.a. Dimas Yuman, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 5:24-cr-00143-TPB-PRL-1 ____________________ Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 25-11426 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 04/24/2026 Page: 2 of 4 2 Opinion of the Court 25-11426 Dimas Yuman-Parada appeals his 36-month sentence for il- legal re-entry by a removed alien, a 15-month upward variance from his advisory Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months’ imprison- ment. Yuman-Parada contends his sentence was substantively un- reasonable because the district court abused its discretion by failing to give proper weight to the advisory Guidelines range and instead considering his past sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment as the benchmark for his sentence. After review, 1 we affirm. The district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac- tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). We may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness to a sentence outside of the ad- visory Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. A major variance requires a more significant justification than a minor variance, and we require the justification be “sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196 (quotation marks omitted). We will vacate a defendant’s sentence as substantively 1 When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). USCA11 Case: 25-11426 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 04/24/2026 Page: 3 of 4 25-11426 Opinion of the Court 3 unreasonable only if we are “left with the definite and firm convic- tion that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190 (quotation marks omitted). Though the district court is required to consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors, “the weight given to each factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and the court may attach gr