Lourdes Soto Armenta v. Todd Blanche
── Lourdes Soto Armenta v. Todd Blanche ──
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date: April 23, 2026
Category: General
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 23 2026
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LOURDES SOTO ARMENTA, No. 20-71309
Petitioner,
Agency No.
v. A208-303-550
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney
General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 21, 2026**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Lourdes Soto Armenta petitions this Court for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) dismissal of her appeal. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “We review denials of motions to reopen . . . for
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.” Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland,
76 F.4th 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Avagyan v. Holder,
646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011). We review the agency’s factual findings for
substantial evidence. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. __, 146 S.Ct. 845, 850–51
(2026). We deny the petition. Because the parties are familiar with the history of
the case, we need not recount it here.
I
The BIA properly concluded that Soto Armenta did not satisfy her burden of
proof to show that there was a nexus between the alleged persecution and a
protected ground. An applicant must show that their proposed protected ground
was at least one central reason the applicant was persecuted to receive asylum and
simply a reason to receive withholding of removal. Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d
1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2021); Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir.
2017).
The BIA upheld the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) finding that Soto Armenta
had not established a nexus between her proposed particular social groups
(“PSGs”) of “single mother head of household” or “single mother in a place where
the cartels are de facto government” and any harm she experienced at the hands of
2
the Cartel. Instead, the BIA held that “[t]he evidence reflects that the respondent
was targeted for purposes of furthering the goals of the cartel, not based on her
membership in either particular social group.”
As the IJ noted, multiple times within the record, Soto Armenta indicated
that the Cartel targeted her because they believed she had access to money. The
record contains little evidence supporting her nexus claim. See I.N.S. v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (noting that either direct or circumstantial
evidence can support a nexus claim but the petitioner “must provide some
evidence” (emphasis in original)). She provided no evidence to support her claim
that she was targeted because she is a single mother. See e.g. Lopez v. Ashcroft,
366 F.3d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, substantial evidence supports the
agency’s determination that neither of her proposed PSGs was a reason for any
harm she experienced. The lack of nexus determination is dispositive of her
asylum and withholding claims.
II
The BIA also properly dism
{# E23 (Nick, ruling section 1 answer 10): quoting a bill or a court opinion works
the way quoting a news article works. Select a passage above and the same panel
opens: the passage goes to the official you choose, with this document's own
address as its source and its own type. #}