Van Horn Metz & Co Inc v. PNC Financial Services Group Inc

── Van Horn Metz & Co Inc v. PNC Financial Services Group Inc ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Date: April 23, 2026 Category: General U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1840 VAN HORN, METZ & CO., INC., Appellant v. PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., properly denominated PNC BANK, N.A. _____________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa. Judge Kai N. Scott, No. 2:23-cv-03596 Before: MATEY, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) Mar. 17, 2026 Decided April 23, 2026 _____________________________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION MATEY, Circuit Judge. Van Horn, Metz & Co. brought an aiding-and-abetting fraud claim against PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. arising out of an embezzlement scheme allegedly perpetrated by Van Horn’s longtime bookkeeper and controller, Antonino Cris- afulli.1 Aiding-and-abetting fraud requires allegations of actual knowledge of fraud by a third party and “substantial assistance or encouragement.” Marion v. Byrn Mawr Tr. Co.,  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, and we “take as true all the factual allegations” in the complaint “and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them” while “disregard[ing] legal conclusions and ‘re- citals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 288 A.3d 76, 87, 89 (Pa. 2023). Allegations of mere negligence are insufficient. Id. at 91– 92. Nor will conclusory allegations of knowledge suffice. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010). Van Horn rests on allegations that PNC’s compli- ance protocols demonstrate actual knowledge of Crisafulli’s scheme, but “[a]n argument that a bank should have recognized a fraud is insufficient to meet the actual knowledge requirement.” Marion, 288 A.3d at 89 (quoting In re TelexFree Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 70, 77 (D. Mass. 2019)); see also DBI Architects, P.C. v. Am. Express Travel-Related Servs. Co., 388 F.3d 886, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is not unusual for employers to pay the credit card debts of their employees.”). As Van Horn failed to plead facts plausibly alleging the bank’s actual knowledge of Crisafulli’s scheme, we will affirm the dismissal of the Amended Complaint. 2