Estate of Justin Paul Smith v. City of Philadelphia

── Estate of Justin Paul Smith v. City of Philadelphia ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Date: April 23, 2026 Category: General U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1284 ESTATE OF JUSTIN PAUL SMITH; CHRISTINA A. SMITH, individually and as wife and co- administratrix of the Estate of Justin Paul Smith; GIANNA SMITH, individually and as daughter and co-administratrix of the Estate of Justin Paul Smith; LISA GAVIN, on behalf of her minor son, J.S., Appellants v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; OFFICER CURT MCKEE _____________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa. Judge Michael M. Baylson, No. 2:21-cv-04395 Before: KRAUSE, MASCOTT, and FISHER, Circuit Judges Submitted Mar. 12, 2026; Decided Apr. 23, 2026 _____________________________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION * KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. The Estate of Justin Paul Smith and certain family members (the Estate) appeal the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer Curt McKee of the Philadelphia Police Department, who shot and killed Smith when responding to a 911 call. Because we conclude that the District Court did not err in determining that there were no genuine disputes of material fact regarding the Estate’s excessive-force claim and * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. that, in light of the undisputed facts, McKee’s use of force was objectively reasonable, we will affirm. 1 I. DISCUSSION 2 When confronted with a potentially dangerous suspect, an officer may not use deadly force without good reason “to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). We must make that assessment “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2011), keeping in mind that officers “are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Against that legal standard, McKee’s use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. As reflected in McKee’s statement of material facts, 3 McKee, in his pursuit of Smith, encountered a distressed resident yelling at Smith to “get out of [her] house,” as a child cried in the background. App. 116, ¶ 10. McKee thus was confronted with an 1 Appellants do not challenge the District Court’s entry of summary judgment on their other claims, including a Monell claim, a state-created danger claim, and state-law claims for assault and battery. See Est. of Smith v. City of Philadelphia, No. 21-cv-4395, 2025 WL 220038, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2025). 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See CoreCivic, Inc. v. Governor of N.J., 145 F.4th 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2025). 3 Appellants contest this and other aspects of McKee’s statement of material facts with the assertion that certain statements cannot be clearly heard on the bodyworn camera footage. These generic assertions do not suffice to raise a genuine dispute, especially in light of this Court’s review of the bodyworn camera footage. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 2 individual who had forced his way into a home where a resident and young children were present. When McKee found Smith in the kitchen, Smith repeatedly fa