United States v. Donald Scott

── United States v. Donald Scott ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Date: April 23, 2026 Category: General U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Nos. 21-1539 and 21-1540 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DONALD A. SCOTT, A/K/A DC & CHANCE D. BONNER, Appellants _____________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa. Judge Christopher C. Connor, Nos. 1:09-cr-00072-001 through 002 Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and MCKEE, Circuit Judges Submitted Mar. 9, 2026; Decided Apr. 23, 2026 _____________________________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION1 MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge. This consolidated appeal concerns whether two juries impermissibly convicted Appellants Donald A. Scott and Chance D. Bonner of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) without a valid predicate offense.2 For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. 2 Scott and Bonner were both granted limited certificates of appealability by this Court. We consolidated the appeals for disposition because Scott and Bonner were jointly charged under a Count warranting appeal. They both appeal the District Court’s denial of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions. We have jurisdiction to consider the denial under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253, and 2255, and the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Two alleged robberies contextualize this appeal. First, on February 1, 2008, Scott— but not Bonner—threatened Montaye Kitt at gunpoint, stole his iPod, and forcibly entered his apartment to take valuables. Second, on March 22, 2008, Scott and Bonner together threatened Eric Clark Jr. at gunpoint, demanded drugs and money, threatened to kill Clark’s youngest child, and put a gun in Clark’s face. The pair then took off Clark’s jacket, searched it, dropped it on the ground after finding nothing valuable, and fled the scene. For their alleged conduct, the Government charged Scott and Bonner with possessing firearms in furtherance of “crimes of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)3 (collectively, the “§ 924(c) Offenses”). As for the predicate crimes of violence, the Government charged Scott and Bonner with completed robbery, attempted robbery, and aiding and abetting robbery under the Hobbs Act4 (collectively, the “Hobbs Act Offenses”). See 18 U.S.C. § 1951; 18 U.S.C. § 2. Scott and Bonner were tried separately. At the close of each trial, the District Court instructed each jury as to the elements of the § 924(c) and Hobbs Act Offenses. Regarding the § 924(c) Offenses, the District Court instructed each jury that either completed Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, or aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, could serve as the predicate crime of violence necessary to convict under § 924(c). And each jury-verdict form allowed each 3 It brought Count 5 against Scott for possessing a gun during the alleged robbery of Kitt and Count 7 against Scott and Bonner for possessing guns during the alleged robbery of Clark. 4 It brought Count 4 against Scott for the alleged robbery of Kitt and Count 6 against Scott and Bonner for the alleged robbery of Clark. 2 jury to convict for the Hobbs Act Offenses without specifying whether it found Scott or Bonner guilty of completed, attempted, or aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, which each jury did. On appeal, Scott and Bonner argue that the juries’ lack of specificity regarding their Hobbs Act verdicts necessitates reversal of the § 924(c) verdicts. To convict on the § 924(c