StarPro, Greens, Inc. v. Polyloom Corporation of America

── StarPro, Greens, Inc. v. Polyloom Corporation of America ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Date: April 23, 2026 Category: NEW USCA11 Case: 25-11270 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2026 Page: 1 of 10 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11270 ____________________ STARPRO, GREENS, INC., a Georgia Corporation, DANIEL E. SELTON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus POLYLOOM CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a Delaware Corporation, a.k.a. TenCate North America, a.k.a. GreenFields, CHALLENGER TURF, INC., a Georgia Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 4:23-cv-00282-WMR ____________________ Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and KIDD, Circuit Judges. USCA11 Case: 25-11270 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2026 Page: 2 of 10 2 Opinion of the Court 25-11270 PER CURIAM: StarPro, Greens, Inc. and Daniel Selton appeal the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of their claims against Polyloom Corporation of America and Challenger Turf, Inc., for alleged mo- nopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; breach of the duty of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty; and breach of warranty. Our review is ple- nary. See, e.g., Dorman v. Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1312 (11th Cir. 2022). The question is whether the appellants set out sufficient al- legations to plausibly plead these particular claims for relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 1 Following oral argument and a review of the record, we af- firm largely based on the analysis set out in the district court’s or- der. Because we write for the parties, we assume their familiarity with the record and set out only what is necessary to explain our decision. I With respect to the Sherman Act claims, it is “well settled that ‘[a] unilateral refusal to deal is [generally] not unlawful.’” Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estee Lauder Companies, Inc., 797 F.3d 1248, 1265 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). At the pleading stage, a claim of refusal to deal in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act requires, 1 The appellants do not challenge the dismissal of their other claims on appeal. Those claims are therefore abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680–81 (11th Cir. 2014). USCA11 Case: 25-11270 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2026 Page: 3 of 10 25-11270 Opinion of the Court 3 among other things, a plausible allegation that the defendant “pos- sess[ed] . . . monopoly power in the relevant market,” as well as “‘[its] willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin- guished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe- rior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’” Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (citation omitted). Similarly, with respect to the attempted monopolization claim, a Sherman Act plaintiff must plausibly al- lege “a dan