Greg Hogue v. State of Arkansas

── Greg Hogue v. State of Arkansas ── Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas Date: April 23, 2026 Category: General Cite as 2026 Ark. 83 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-25-575 Opinion Delivered: April 23, 2026 GREG HOGUE APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTEENTH DIVISION; V. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND FOR ORAL STATE OF ARKANSAS ARGUMENT APPELLEE [NO. 60CR-94-904] HONORABLE KAREN D. WHATLEY, JUDGE AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED. NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice Greg Hogue appeals the circuit court’s denial of his petition to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence for life in prison without parole violates Arkansas’s constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishments. See Ark. Const. art. 2, § 9. Hogue acknowledges that—because he was eighteen when he committed capital murder— he cannot rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which created an Eighth Amendment prohibition on mandatory life sentences for juveniles. 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). Instead, he asks the court to extend Miller’s protections because other jurisdictions have done so. We reject that request for two reasons. First, we have held that these types of claims are not cognizable on a petition to correct an illegal sentence. See Mister v. State, 2022 Ark. 35, at 7, 639 S.W.3d 331, 336 (rejecting an Eighth Amendment claim on a petition to correct an illegal sentence). Illegal sentences exist only when a defendant receives a sentence outside the permitted statutory range or when the circuit court acts without jurisdiction. Id. at 5, 639 S.W.3d at 335. Hogue’s constitutional argument does not fall into either category. As such, it is better suited for a habeas proceeding. See Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, at 8, 434 S.W.3d 364, 369 (entertaining a Miller claim on habeas). Second, even assuming his claim was cognizable, it would still fail because nothing in the Arkansas Constitution requires a categorical expansion of Miller. On the contrary, this court has previously interpreted our constitution consistent with its federal counterpart. Kelley v. Johnson, 2016 Ark. 268, at 14, 496 S.W.3d 346, 357. And Hogue does not explain how textual or historical differences compel the more protective categorical rule that he seeks. See Gamble v. State, 2026 Ark. 44, at 11. Nor does the authority Hogue cites from other jurisdictions alter the analysis. At most, Hogue cites cases extending Miller based on data indicating that there is little neurological difference between a seventeen-year-old juvenile and an eighteen-year-old adult. See People v. Taylor, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 1085247, at *5 (Mich. 2025). But that data existed at the time the Supreme Court decided Miller. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 n.5 (citing portions of an amicus brief arguing brain development continues into an individual’s twenties). So that data is not a basis for extending Miller’s holding, and we reaffirm our previous refusal to extend Miller.1 See Gibbs v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 29, at 1, 660 1 Rather than compelling an expanded categorical rule, the data Hogue references suggest Miller should not have set a categorical rule prohibiting mandatory life sentences at all—arbitrarily shielding “young killers, giving them a greater chance to reform themselves at the risk that they will kill again.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 502 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, at most, Hogue’s argument merely underscores why legislatures are better equipped