RODNEY BUNCH v. STATE OF ARKANSAS; WILLIAM MARTIN JONES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PROSECUTING ATTORNEY; TIMOTHY DAVIS FOX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE; LEIGH BIGGERS-PATTERSON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY; TAMMY HARRIS; AND Willard PROCTOR, JR.

── RODNEY BUNCH v. STATE OF ARKANSAS; WILLIAM MARTIN JONES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PROSECUTING ATTORNEY; TIMOTHY DAVIS FOX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE; LEIGH BIGGERS-PATTERSON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY; TAMMY HARRIS; AND Willard PROCTOR, JR. ── Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas Date: April 23, 2026 Category: General Cite as 2026 Ark. 80 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-25-255 Opinion Delivered: April 23, 2026 RODNEY BUNCH APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT; SEVENTEENTH DIVISION V. [NO. 60CV-24-2669] STATE OF ARKANSAS; WILLIAM HONORABLE MACKIE M. PIERCE, MARTIN JONES, IN HIS OFFICIAL JUDGE CAPACITY AS PROSECUTING ATTORNEY; TIMOTHY DAVIS AFFIRMED. FOX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE; LEIGH BIGGERS-PATTERSON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY; TAMMY HARRIS; AND WILLARD PROCTOR, JR. APPELLEES CODY HILAND, Associate Justice Appellant Rodney Bunch appeals from the dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and writ of mandamus challenging the imposition of an enhanced life sentence for aggravated robbery based on his status as a habitual offender pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501 (Repl. 1997).1 1 Bunch was convicted of aggravated robbery as a habitual offender and sentenced to life imprisonment under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See Bunch v. State, 344 Ark. 730, 43 S.W.3d 132 (2001). Bunch’s convictions and life sentence arose from three trials in two cases in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. In case number 60CR-98-3654, Bunch was charged with  I. Background Bunch filed suit against the State of Arkansas, William Jones, Timothy Fox, and Leigh Biggers-Patterson in their official capacities, asserting entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief. His petition alleged multiple trial errors, including misapplication of the habitual-offender statute, a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), a defective information, and insufficient evidence. Bunch also named Tammy Harris and Willard Proctor, identified as his trial counsel, but alleged no specific facts regarding their liability as individuals. Proctor moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition failed to state any claim against him and was, in substance, an improper and successive petition under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. He also adopted the State’s arguments. Harris was never served. Bunch instead moved for an order requiring her to accept service and later sought a default judgment, raising what appeared to be an ineffective-assistance claim. The circuit court entered three orders (1) dismissing the claims against Harris without prejudice for failure to obtain service within 120 days under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i); (2) dismissing the claims against the State defendants as an untimely and successive Rule 37.1 petition; and (3) granting Proctor’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the the aggravated robbery of, and theft of property from, Stephanie Springer Transue and was tried in 1999, which resulted in a mistrial. Before the Transue case was re-tried in 2000, Bunch was convicted on multiple counts of aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft of property in a separate case, 60CR-99-276, for the aggravated robberies of Head Waves salon customers and was later separately tried for the aggravated robbery MDC salon customers. See Bunch v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 58 (per curiam). Because Bunch had been convicted of two violent Class Y felonies, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in the retrial of the Transue case. 2 orders dismissing the petition with prejudice. The dismissal without prejudice as to Harris is not a final, appealable order. II. Standard of Review