Bobo v. Appellate Division of Super. Ct.

── Bobo v. Appellate Division of Super. Ct. ── Court: California Court of Appeal Date: April 22, 2026 Category: General Filed 4/22/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AIMEE BOBO, D087393 Petitioner, v. (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. M298511; APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE Appellate Division No. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN 25MW000137C) DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate challenging a judgment of the Appellate Division of Superior Court of San Diego County, Presiding Judge Albert T. Harutunian III and Judges Frank L. Birchak and Maryann D’Addezio. Petition granted. Jo E. Super, Chief Deputy Public Defender and Ryan M. Ahern, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent.  Heather Ferbert, City Attorney, Paige E. Folkman and Karen S. Li, Assistant City Attorneys, and Michael E. Cosgrove, Deputy City Attorney, for Real Party in Interest. Aimee Bobo was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd. (c)(2)) after running a red light, colliding with another vehicle, and killing the other driver, Mary Donato. Before trial, she requested misdemeanor diversion under section 1001.95. The trial court found Bobo eligible for misdemeanor diversion but not suitable on the ground that her negligent conduct caused the death of another person. Bobo filed a petition for writ of mandate in the appellate division of superior court. The appellate division summarily denied the petition. She then filed another petition for writ of mandate in this court challenging the appellate division’s ruling. After requesting an informal response from the People, we issued an order to show cause. We now conclude Bobo is entitled to relief. A defendant charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter is eligible for misdemeanor diversion because it is not one of the excluded offenses specifically listed in the statute. (§ 1001.95, subd. (e).) This offense necessarily requires criminally negligent conduct resulting in the death of another person. By relying solely on facts inherent in the qualifying offense and failing to connect them to the underlying purposes of the misdemeanor diversion statute, the trial court abused its discretion in deciding Bobo was not suitable for diversion. On this record, Bobo has also demonstrated the absence of an adequate legal remedy and irreparable harm if relief were denied. We will therefore issue a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to vacate its order summarily denying Bobo’s petition for writ of mandate and issue a new order (1) issuing 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 a peremptory writ in the first instance, and (2) directing the superior court to vacate its order denying misdemeanor diversion and reconsider Bobo’s suitability in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We take the facts from the allegations of the petition and return and the exhibits attached to both. These facts are essentially undisputed because neither party has contested the factual allegations of the other. On the evening of November 11, 2024, Bobo was driving a Ford F-450 truck southbound on Kearny Villa Road approaching the signal-controlled intersection with an off-ramp from Route 163. A few seconds after Bobo’s light turned red, she went through the intersection. Bobo’s vehicle struck the driver’s side of a Toyota Highlander that was turning left on a green light from the off-ramp onto northbound Kearny Villa Road. The speed limit on Kearny Villa Road at the intersection was 50 miles per hour. Bobo and other wit