Santana v. Studebaker Health Care Center

── Santana v. Studebaker Health Care Center ── Court: California Court of Appeal Date: April 22, 2026 Category: General Filed 4/7/26; Certified for Publication 4/22/26 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN J. ASENCION SANTANA, B343640 Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24STCV12865) v. STUDEBAKER HEALTH CARE CENTER, LLC, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura A. Seigle, Judge. Reversed with directions. Eisenberg & Associates, Michael B. Eisenberg, Bryan W. Edgar; Joseph S. Socher for Defendant and Appellant. The Sentinel Firm, Seung Yang, Tiffany Hyun, Jeffrey Jackson, Christine Noh; Work Lawyers, Justin Lo and Jarrod Nakano for Plaintiff and Respondent.  INTRODUCTION When Studebaker Health Care Center, Inc. hired J. Asencion Santana, Studebaker required him to sign a series of documents. In three of the documents Studebaker and Santana agreed to arbitrate most disputes arising out of their employment relationship, except for non-individual claims brought as a private attorney general under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). After his employment ended Santana filed a wage-and-hour class action against Studebaker, which included a cause of action under PAGA. Studebaker filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the trial court denied it. Studebaker appeals from the order denying its motion to compel arbitration, arguing the trial court erred in ruling that, because of various “conflicts” among the three arbitration-related documents, there was no valid agreement to arbitrate. Studebaker also argues the trial court erred in ruling in the alternative the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable and unenforceable. We agree with Studebaker on both counts. Though the agreement to arbitrate contains a few ambiguities, those ambiguities do not undermine the parties’ clear agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes. And though the agreement to arbitrate reflects some procedural unconscionability—as contracts of adhesion generally do—the agreement does not contain any substantively unconscionable terms and is not unenforceable. Therefore, we reverse. 2  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Santana Applies To Work for Studebaker and Signs Several Arbitration-related Documents Santana began working at a skilled nursing facility in December 2020. Studebaker purchased the facility in January 2023 and became Santana’s employer. As part of its onboarding process,1 Studebaker asked Santana to sign three arbitration-related agreements (collectively, the agreement to arbitrate).2 He did. The first document, titled “California Mutual Dispute Resolution Agreement” (California ADR agreement), included a mutual agreement to resolve disputes through binding arbitration. The California ADR agreement stated, in relevant part: “This Agreement applies to claims Employee may bring against the Company for wrongful termination, discrimination, harassment, retaliation, breach of contract, and wage and hour violations, whether directly or indirectly, and torts such as invasion of privacy, assault and battery, or defamation. This Agreement also applies to claims that the Company might bring 1 “Onboarding” has emerged from the murky reservoir of corporate jargon and has “mainstreamed” to more general usage. It is “defined as ‘the act or process of orienting and training a new employee.’” (Garcia v. Expert Staffing West (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 408, 413, fn. 4.) 2 Because Santana signed the three documents at the same time and they relate to the same matter, we construe them together. (See Civ. Code, § 1642; Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc