Markowitz v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

── Markowitz v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 22, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PHILIP MARKOWITZ, No. 25-1747 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-06528-ODW-MRW v. MEMORANDUM* JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a National Banking Association; CLAIR DAWSON, an individual; DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 20, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: FRIEDLAND and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and VITALIANO, District Judge.*** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.  Philip Markowitz brought this action asserting various tort claims against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) after the bank froze his account and, for several months, refused to allow him to withdraw funds from two checks he deposited in the account. The district court granted summary judgment to Chase on Markowitz’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. The district court’s summary-judgment order also limited the time period for which Markowitz could recover on his claims for conversion and negligent infliction of emotional distress, which were tried to a jury. Markowitz now appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Yonay v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 163 F.4th 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2026). We review the district court’s decisions about the scope of cross-examination for abuse of discretion. Dorn v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 397 F.3d 1183, 1192 (9th Cir. 2005). 1. The district court correctly granted partial summary judgment to Chase on the conversion claim. The court held that Chase was entitled to summary judgment for claims based on its conduct through December 8, 2023, when Chase established that the two checks from SureTec Insurance Co. (SureTec) that Markowitz deposited were genuine. 2 25-1747  An element of the California tort of conversion is “the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act” of plaintiff’s property. Lee v. Hanley, 354 P.3d 334, 344 (Cal. 2015) (quoting Welco Elecs., Inc. v. Mora, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 881 (Ct. App. 2014)). The terms of Markowitz’s account authorized Chase to freeze the account “pending investigation.” There is no genuine dispute that Chase was conducting an investigation until December 8, so it was entitled to freeze the account until then—preventing there from being any wrongful act during that period. Chase was concerned because the deposit involved two checks from the same issuer, “the deposit was out of pattern,” and the typeface on the checks appeared irregular, all of which led Chase to suspect that the payee name on the checks may have been altered. Chase actively, though intermittently, tried to reach SureTec from May until December to verify the checks. In May, Chase tri