Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. v. Lourdes Lopez

── Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. v. Lourdes Lopez ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 22, 2026 Category: General FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, No.21-56295 INC., D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:20-cv-04122- CBM-AFM v. LOURDES LOPEZ, in her official OPINION capacity as City Clerk for the City of Oxnard, Defendant-Appellee, and DOES, 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted En Banc September 9, 2025 San Francisco, California Filed April 22, 2026 2 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Consuelo M. Callahan, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, John B. Owens, Ryan D. Nelson, Eric D. Miller, Daniel P. Collins, Lawrence VanDyke, Lucy H. Koh and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Koh; Dissent by Judge Collins SUMMARY* First Amendment/Campaign Contribution Limits The en banc court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of Oxnard (the “City”), in a case in which Moving Oxnard Forward (“MOF”), a political advocacy nonprofit organization, challenged the constitutionality of certain campaign finance limitations for municipal elections included in the Oxnard Government Accountability and Ethics Act (“Measure B”). MOF alleged that Measure B’s per candidate contribution limits violate the First Amendment and that the aggregate contribution limits violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. As to the per candidate contribution limits, the en banc court first held that the City established a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ 3 corruption or its appearance. Recognizing the low evidentiary bar as explained in Lair v. Motl, 873 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2017), the en banc court held the City offered more than enough evidence to demonstrate its interest because it offered: (1) a newspaper article alleging corruption by City officials; (2) an investigation by the District Attorney, resulting in a report detailing numerous instances of behaviors that gave rise to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption; (3) a survey showing 77% of residents wanted a government accountability measure; and (4) the fact that 82% of the City’s voters approved Measure B. With the City having established a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, the en banc court next considered the four “danger signs” that contribution limits may be unconstitutionally low as set forth in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). The en banc court held that the first three danger signs were not present because (1) Measure B’s per candidate contribution limits are per candidate per election, not per office per election cycle; (2) higher limits apply to contributions from political action committees, and no contribution limits apply to political parties; and (3) the contribution limits are comparable to contribution limits imposed by other California cities of comparable size. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has only addressed the constitutionality of state and federal contribution limits and not city contribution limits, the en banc court assumed without deciding that the fourth Randall danger sign— whether the City’s contribution limit is below previously upheld city limits—was present.