Flores Ramirez v. Blanche

── Flores Ramirez v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 22, 2026 Category: General FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 22 2026 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RUBEN AVISAI FLORES RAMIREZ, No. 24-2216 Petitioner, Agency No. v. A205-908-084 TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 20, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: S.R. THOMAS, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges. Ruben Avisai Flores Ramirez petitions this Court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) denial of his motion to reopen. We have * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, but lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings. Menendez-Gonzalez v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2019). “We review denials of motions to reopen . . . for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.” Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part. Because the parties are familiar with the history of the case, we need not recount it here. I The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. Subject to exceptions, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final removal order. Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 145 (2015). “[The] ninety-day period is subject to equitable tolling.” Bent v. Garland, 115 F.4th 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2024). “A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010)). 2  The BIA did not err in determining that the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz- Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021), was not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Claims for equitable tolling can be based on changes in law. Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2020). In Niz-Chavez, the Supreme Court held that a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) must contain all the statutorily required information about the noncitizen’s removal hearing in a single document. 593 U.S. at 168–69, 172. Because he was served with a defective NTA, Flores Ramirez argues that the “change in law” under Niz-Chavez amounted to an extraordinary circumstance that warranted equitable tolling of the motion to reopen deadline. However, Niz- Chavez did not amount to an extraordinary circumstance justifying tolling because Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated on reh'g en banc, 998 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2021), which resulted in the same holding as Niz-Chavez, was already established law at the time the BIA dismissed Flores Ramirez’s original appeal. It continued to be good law for the full ninety days leading up