United States v. Fencl

── United States v. Fencl ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 22, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1373 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cr-03101-JLS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JOHN THOMAS FENCL, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 3, 2026 Pasadena, California Before: WARDLAW and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge.** John Thomas Fencl was convicted of three counts of knowingly possessing unregistered short-barreled rifles and four counts of knowingly possessing unlawful firearm silencers. He appeals both the district court’s denial of his * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. motion to suppress evidence and his conviction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1. The district court did not err in denying Fencl’s motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his home. “We review a ‘district court’s rulings on motions to suppress,’ including applications of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, . . . ‘de novo,’” and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Barnes, 895 F.3d 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Underwood, 725 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013)). Here, both parties agree that officers searched Fencl’s home without a warrant or other exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the search. But, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation took place, the exclusionary rule does not apply necessarily apply here. “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). Accordingly, “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,” but not mere isolated negligence. Id. The district court properly applied the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. “[O]ur good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known 2 24-1373 that the search was illegal.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.23 (1984). Detective White made multiple attempts to confirm Fencl’s probationary status: he checked the police department database which indicated that Fencl was still on probation; he followed his department’s policy and contacted the probation office to confirm that Fencl was still on probation; and his partner called the City Attorney’s Office and an attorney from the office stated that Fencl was still on probation. While all three sources provided factually incorrect information to Detective White, “the good faith exception” can apply to an officer who “reasonably relied on an external source, which turned out to be erroneous.” United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir.