United States v. Colfax

── United States v. Colfax ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 22, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-7218 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cr-05326-BHS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* SCHYLAR COLFAX, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 20, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and KOH, Circuit Judges. Schylar Colfax (“Colfax”) appeals his conviction for abusive sexual contact with a minor (“AT”) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 1153(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).  1. The district court did not err in denying Colfax’s motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). “We review the denial of a motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence de novo.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 982 F.3d 766, 776 (9th Cir. 2020). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e determine whether ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2010)). The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Colfax knowingly had “sexual contact” with AT, which was defined in the unchallenged jury instructions as “the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the buttock of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse and gratify the sexual desire of any person.” See also 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) (providing similar statutory definition of “sexual contact”). For example, the government introduced evidence that Colfax did not normally take care of AT when she was sick, but on the day of the incident, he entered AT’s bedroom when she was home sick from school; that Colfax “touched” AT’s “back private part” and “butt” while the bedroom door was closed; that Colfax continued touching AT after she told him to stop; that Colfax lied to AT’s relative about AT’s whereabouts when Colfax and AT were in AT’s 2 24-7218 bedroom; that Colfax abruptly left the house after being discovered; and that Colfax falsely claimed to be AT’s father when confronted. Based on this evidence, a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Colfax touched the buttock of AT with an intent to arouse and gratify his sexual desire.1 On appeal, Colfax challenges the credibility of AT and various other witnesses. However, “a court of appeals may not usurp the role of the finder of fact by considering how it would have resolved the conflicts, made the inferences, or considered the evidence at trial.” Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164. Resolving all credibility conflicts in favor of the prosecution, as we are required to do, the evidence presented at trial was suf