Michael Miller v. Judicial Council United States Third Circuit Court

── Michael Miller v. Judicial Council United States Third Circuit Court ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Date: April 22, 2026 Category: General NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 25-2616 ___________ MICHAEL MILLER, Appellant v. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT; JUDGE THOMAS M. HARDIMAN, In His Official Capacity; JUDGE PATTY SHWARTZ, In Her Official Capacity ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 5:25-cv-04633) District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) December 4, 2025 Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: April 22, 2026) _________ OPINION* _________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM Michael Miller appeals from an order dismissing his complaint. We will affirm. I. Miller has filed pro se several election-related lawsuits and appeals in this Circuit. Dissatisfied with the results thus far, he filed eleven judicial-misconduct complaints. After those proceedings concluded, he filed pro se the civil action at issue here seeking in essence to collaterally challenge the outcome of those proceedings. Toward that end, he named as defendants the Judicial Council of this Circuit and two of its member judges, and he alleged that various of their rulings violated the governing statutes. He also asserted what he called a “conditional” claim that, if the rulings were statutorily authorized, then the statutes violate the First Amendment as applied to him. The District Court sua sponte dismissed Miller’s complaint for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction. Miller then filed a timely motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), which the court denied. In its orders, the court held that 28 U.S.C. §§ 352(c) and 357(c) divested it of jurisdiction over Miller’s challenges to the orders entered in his judicial- misconduct proceedings and that the court otherwise lacked a basis to review the defendants’ alleged conduct. Miller appeals.1 II. 1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the face of the complaint. See Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 395 (3d Cir. 2012). We also exercise plenary review over the legal issues raised by Miller’s Rule 59(e) motion, though we review the ultimate denial of that motion only for abuse of discretion. See Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446-47 & n.20 (3d Cir. 2012). 2  We will affirm because the District Court properly held that Miller’s complaint is barred by § 357(c). That statute governs review of orders in judicial misconduct proceedings, and it provides in relevant part that “all orders and determinations [in such proceedings], including denials of petitions for review, shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 357(c). We agree that this statute bars the claim