United States v. Mitchell

── United States v. Mitchell ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Date: April 22, 2026 Category: General 25-1421 United States v. Mitchell UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of April, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, DENNY CHIN, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. No. 25-1421 JOSEPH MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________ For Appellee: JOSHUA ROTHENBERG, Assistant United States Attorney, for John A. Sarcone III, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY. For Defendant-Appellant: RANDALL D. UNGER, Kew Gardens, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the appeal from the May 20, 2025 judgment of the district court is DISMISSED. Joseph Mitchell appeals from his judgment of conviction after a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and one count of possessing firearms as a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8), for which he received a sentence of 135 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ supervised release. Mitchell argues that (i) his conviction under section 922(g)(1) should be vacated because “the felon[- ]in[-]possession statute violates the Second Amendment,” and (ii) his within- Guidelines sentence of 135 months’ imprisonment is substantively unreasonable. Mitchell Br. at 17, 18–21. The government contends that Mitchell waived these 2 arguments pursuant to the terms of the parties’ plea agreement. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as needed to explain our decision. “We review plea agreements, including waivers of the right to appeal, de novo and in accordance with general principles of the law of contract.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2018). And while “we construe” ambiguities in such waivers “strictly against the government,” id., the terms are “presumptively enforceable if” they have “been entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and competently,” United States v. Lajeunesse, 85 F.4th 679, 692 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we will decline to enforce an appeal waiver only in limited circumstances – for example, where a defendant’s fundamental rights have been violated, such as when a sentencing court relies on a defendant’s race or naturalized status to