Davidow v. Brandt

── Davidow v. Brandt ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 21, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DAVID DAVIDOW; SHERYL DE MERS, No. 24-1230 domestic partners, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01594-RAJ Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. MEMORANDUM* TRAVIS BRANDT, Defendant - Appellant, and JANE DOE BRANDT, ZALNATRAV INC, RAVENARK, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding Submitted January 30, 2026** Before: BENNETT, BADE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).  Defendant-Appellant Travis Brandt, appearing pro se, appeals several district court orders in this dispute arising from a contract to manufacture and sell a boat to Plaintiffs-Appellees David Davidow and Sheryl De Mers. We affirm. 1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining Brandt from selling the boat to a third party.1 See BNSF Ry. Co. v. County of Alameda, 7 F.4th 874, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2021) (“We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision regarding preliminary injunctive relief. We review findings of fact for clear error . . . .” (citation omitted)). On appeal, Brandt raises four arguments to support his claim that the district court erred in issuing injunctive relief: (1) the district court’s finding of a threat of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs was improper because the boat was a prototype; (2) Plaintiffs instructed him to sell the boat; (3) as the manufacturer, he was the boat’s legal owner under the contract; and (4) he had only attempted to sell a different boat—not Plaintiffs’ boat—to a third party. Whether the boat was a prototype is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ threatened injury. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Plaintiffs would be harmed by 1 Brandt also argues that the district court erred in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), which enjoined Brandt from selling the boat to a third party until the district court issued the preliminary injunction. “Because our analysis is substantially identical for the injunction and the TRO, we do not address the TRO separately.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 2 24-1230 the sale of the boat, that Plaintiffs did not instruct Brandt to sell it, and that Brandt had entered a contract to sell Plaintiffs’ boat. See id. at 879. 2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brandt’s motion to compel discovery of Plaintiffs’ financial records. See Mabe v. San Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We review discovery rulings for abuse of discretion.”). We will not disturb a decision to deny discovery without a showing that it will result in “actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Brandt fails to demonstrate how the district court’s ruling resulted in actual and substantial prejudice.