United States v. Brown

── United States v. Brown ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Date: April 21, 2026 Category: General 24-1227 United States v. Brown United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit August Term 2024 Argued: April 10, 2025 Decided: April 21, 2026 No. 24-1227 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. MARK RICHARD BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 22-cr-39, Phillip M. Halpern, Judge. Before: WESLEY, SULLIVAN, and PARK, Circuit Judges. Mark Brown appeals from a judgment of conviction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Halpern, J.) following his guilty plea to fourteen counts of making false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, and one count of theft of government funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. The district court sentenced Brown to forty-six months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release, and ordered forfeiture and restitution. For Brown’s term of supervised release, the district court imposed the mandatory conditions required under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), the standard conditions recommended under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 5D1.3(c), and several special conditions. Brown did not object to any of these conditions at sentencing. On appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred in imposing a special condition that (1) requires the installation of software to allow probation officers to monitor “all activity” on any device “that can access to the internet” without reasonable suspicion of a violation of supervision; (2) permits probation officers to conduct “unannounced examinations” of any of Brown’s computer devices; and (3) requires that any electronic devices that Brown could use “in the course of employment” be subject to “monitoring restrictions as permitted by the employer.” App’x at 153, 165. Brown argues that the condition is overbroad, not narrowly tailored, and tantamount to an impermissible occupational restriction. We are not persuaded. District courts have broad discretion to impose any conditions of supervised release, and the special condition imposed here was reasonable in light of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b). And the monitoring of Brown’s work devices does not constitute an “occupational restriction” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5 because it does not prohibit him from engaging in a specific occupation, does not limit the terms on which he may do so, and is reasonably necessary to protect the public. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in imposing the special condition of supervised release. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED. DARRELL FIELDS, Federal Defenders of New York, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant. SHAUN E. WERBELOW (Benjamin D. Klein, Michael D. Maimin, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Danielle R. Sassoon, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee. 2 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge: Mark Brown appeals from a judgment of conviction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of