United States v. Seugasala

── United States v. Seugasala ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 20, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-44 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:13-cr-00092-RRB-1 v. MEMORANDUM* STUART T. SEUGASALA, AKA Tone, Defendant - Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-4235 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:13-cr-00092-RRB v. STUART T. SEUGASALA, AKA Tone, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 17, 2026** Portland, Oregon * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Defendant Stuart Seugasala appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). His Rule 60(b) motion asked the district court to vacate its prior order partially denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his convictions for drug trafficking, kidnapping, and firearms offenses. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court judge, Judge Ralph Beistline, abused his discretion when he declined to recuse himself from Defendant’s trial, resentencing, and habeas proceedings based on Judge Beistline’s undisclosed personal relationship with a witness in the case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We affirm. We review a district court’s grant of relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion. Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2017). We also review a judge’s decision not to recuse himself for abuse of discretion. United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2012). 1. Defendant argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a) when it denied his Rule 60(b) motion on jurisdictional grounds and subsequently issued an indicative ruling explaining that it would deny the motion on the merits once it regained jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a) (If a party files a motion “that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal 2 24-44 that has been docketed and is pending, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion; (2) deny the motion [on its merits]; or (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.”). Assuming Defendant is correct that the district court committed procedural error, that error was harmless. Indeed, Defendant argues that “practically speaking, the court’s [denial on jurisdictional grounds and indicative ruling] operated as a deferral.” Rule 62.1(a)(1) expressly authorizes a district court to defer consideration of a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(1). An effective deferral therefore could not have prejudiced Defendant. Thus, any procedural error the district court committed was harmless and does not justify vacating the district court’s order denyi