United States v. Aguirre
── United States v. Aguirre ──
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date: April 20, 2026
Category: General
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-2052
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:23-cr-00187-DCN-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
HECTOR AGUIRRE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 16, 2026**
Portland, Oregon
Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Hector Aguirre appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them
here. We affirm.
1. The district court properly denied Aguirre’s motion to suppress because
Officer Seferino Tapia’s opening of Aguirre’s driver-side door was reasonable
under the circumstances of the traffic stop. The parties do not dispute that the
officers lawfully stopped Aguirre after observing traffic violations, including a
missing front license plate and suspended registration. When Officer Tapia
approached the vehicle, Aguirre’s driver-side window was only partially open and
tinted, which obstructed Officer Tapia’s view of the interior, and Aguirre stated
that the window was broken. Aguirre also indicated that the door could not be
opened from the inside. Under these circumstances, opening the door from the
outside was a minimal and reasonable step to facilitate communication with the
driver and ensure officer safety during the stop. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 110 (1977); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356 (2015).
Additional circumstances reinforced the reasonableness of Officer Tapia’s
actions. Officer Tapia knew that Aguirre was a gang affiliate from prior contacts,
and observed a red bandana associated with a gang hanging from the vehicle’s
rearview mirror. Given the obstructed visibility into the vehicle, as well as these
safety considerations, Officer Tapia’s limited action in opening the door was
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111.
2 25-2052
Because Officer Tapia’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances,
we need not reach the question of whether opening Aguirre’s driver-side door was
a search.
2. Even if Officer Tapia’s act of opening the door constituted a Fourth
Amendment violation, suppression would not be warranted because the challenged
evidence was discovered through an independent source. See United States v.
Gorman, 859 F.3d 706, 718 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232,
238 (2016)).
Here, a second officer, Talon Derrick, independently developed probable
cause to search Aguirre’s vehicle from a lawful vantage point at the passenger-side
window. From that position, Officer Derrick detected the odor of marijuana
emanating from the vehicle and observed behavior consistent with drug use,
including that Aguirre looked “moderately lethargic.” Aguirre also admitted to
Offic
{# E23 (Nick, ruling section 1 answer 10): quoting a bill or a court opinion works
the way quoting a news article works. Select a passage above and the same panel
opens: the passage goes to the official you choose, with this document's own
address as its source and its own type. #}