State of Florida v. Scott

── State of Florida v. Scott ── Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida Date: April 17, 2026 Category: General DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. CHRISTINE HEIDI SCOTT, Appellee. No. 2D2025-0446 April 17, 2026 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; David Lee Denkin, Judge. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Taylor A. Schell, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. Christine Heidi Scott, pro se. MORRIS, Judge. The State of Florida appeals an order dismissing its information against Christine Heidi Scott for obstructing and resisting without violence. Because we conclude that the original information was legally sufficient, we reverse and remand. We review de novo a trial court's order dismissing an information. State v. Morival, 75 So. 3d 810, 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(b) provides in relevant part that an "information on which the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." "Each count of an . . . information . . . shall allege the essential facts constituting the offense charged [and] shall recite the official or customary citation of the statute . . . that the defendant is alleged to have violated." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(d)(1). Additionally, "[e]ach count . . . shall contain allegations stating as definitively as possible the time and place of the commission of the offense charged." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(d)(3). "For an offense that may be committed by doing 1 or more of several acts, or by 1 or more of several means, or with 1 or more of several intents or results, it is permissible to allege in the disjunctive or alternative such acts, means, intents, or results." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(k)(5). No . . . information, or any count thereof, shall be dismissed . . . on account of any defect in the form of the . . . information . . . unless the court shall be of the opinion that the . . . information is so vague, indistinct, and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him or her in the preparation of a defense or expose the accused after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(o). "At its core, a charging document must comport with basic notions of due process by placing a defendant on adequate notice of the specific nature of the criminal charge." Duarte v. State, 59 So. 3d 313, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). "An information is sufficient if it tracks the statute . . . ." State v. Lee, 651 So. 2d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); see also State v. Bostic, 446 So. 2d 264, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (concluding in relevant part that the amended information was legally sufficient because it tracked the statutory language); cf. DuBoise v. State, 520 So. 2d 260, 265 2 (Fla. 1988) (explaining that where an indictment specifically referenced the statute underlying the charged offense and where the statute "specifically defines all the elements of the offense," the defendant was placed "on adequate notice of the crime being charged" (citing Cotton v. State, 395 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981))). "[T]he [S]tate need not present proof with which it intends to establish its case." Lee, 651 So. 2d at 1222. Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2024), provides in relevant part that [w]hoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer . . . or other person legally authorized to execute process in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a misdemea