Nakagaki v. ICAO

── Nakagaki v. ICAO ── Court: Colorado Court of Appeals Date: April 16, 2026 Category: General 25CA2272 Nakagaki v ICAO 04-16-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA2272 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 16035-2025 Brittany Nakagaki, Petitioner, v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Eastern Rio Blanco County Health Services District, d/b/a Pioneers Medical Center, Respondents. ORDER AFFIRMED Division V Opinion by JUDGE TOW Welling and Lipinsky, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 16, 2026 Brittany Nakagaki, Pro Se No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office Bechtel & Santo, Michael C. Santo, Keely McCabe, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Respondent Eastern Rio Blanco County Health Services District ¶1 Brittany Nakagaki appeals an order denying her claim for unemployment benefits. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 Nakagaki worked as a hospital sterilization technician until her employer, East Rio Blanco County Health Services District (Employer), discharged her. Shortly thereafter, a deputy for the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) granted Nakagaki’s claim for unemployment benefits. Employer appealed that decision, and the Division conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding the reasons for Nakagaki’s job separation. ¶3 After the hearing, the hearing officer found that Employer discharged Nakagaki “for not following instructions given to her, not following sterilization procedures, and refusing to do work she was asked to do.” He further found that Nakagaki “was reasonably aware of the standards of her position and failed to meet them on multiple occasions.” The hearing officer concluded that Nakagaki was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for failing to meet “established job performance or other defined standards” under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S. 2025. 1 ¶4 Nakagaki appealed to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel). The Panel affirmed, holding that the hearing officer’s factual findings “support the conclusion that [Nakagaki] is at fault for the separation from employment, and the disqualification is therefore warranted pursuant to [section] 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX).” II. Standard of Review and Legal Principles ¶5 We may not disturb factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings do not support its decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2025. Evidence is substantial if it is “probative, credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory testimony or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶6 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from receiving benefits if their “failure to meet established job performance or other defined standards” caused their job 2  separation. To evaluate cause, the hearing officer considers the totality of the evidence and determines the motivating factors in the employee’s separation. Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989). “All that is required to establish a disqualification pursuant to [section] 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) is that claimant did not do the job for which [they were] hired and which [they] knew was expected of [them].” Pabst v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65 (Colo. App. 1992). ¶7 The disqualifying provisions of se