Aguilar-Velasquez v. Blanche

── Aguilar-Velasquez v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 17, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JENNY CAROLINA AGUILAR- No. 23-61 VELASQUEZ, Agency No. A206-731-646 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 16, 2026** Portland, Oregon Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge VANDYKE. Petitioner Jenny Carolina Aguilar-Velasquez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“IJ’s”) order denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). “We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo.” Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020)). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. 1. We review the agency’s determination that Petitioner did not establish past persecution for substantial evidence. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. __, 2026 WL 598435, at *5–6 (Mar. 4, 2026). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination. Petitioner contends that the record compels the conclusion that she suffered past persecution because (1) gang members forced Petitioner to lay on the ground at gunpoint; (2) Petitioner saw both her husband and his brother be taken by gang members, and both were killed soon after; (3) the same gang later killed her other brother-in-law; (4) the gang made threats against her husband’s family (the Guifarro-Figueroa family); and (5) after her husband’s family had moved away from the area and Petitioner went to live with her mother, gang members drove by 2 23-61 Petitioner’s mother’s house and later asked her younger brother where she had gone. Although Petitioner was only 17 at the time, the fact that she was forced to lay on the ground at gunpoint does not establish past persecution. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases where brief detentions without physical harm did not compel finding of past persecution). As to the actions taken against members of the Guifarro-Figueroa family, “harm to a petitioner’s close relatives, friends, or associates may contribute to a successful showing of past persecution” where that harm is “part of a pattern of persecution closely tied to [the petitioner her]self.” Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Here, however, the record does not compel the conclusion that the deaths of Petitioner’s husband and his brother