Betancourt Cano v. Blanche

── Betancourt Cano v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 17, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SANDRA LILIANA BETANCOURT No. 25-667 CANO; SALMA JANAI OBANDO Agency Nos. BETANCOURT, A220-717-224 A220-717-226 Petitioners, v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 16, 2026** Portland, Oregon Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Petitioners Sandra Liliana Betancourt Cano (“Betancourt Cano”) and Salma Janai Obando Betancourt, natives and citizens of Colombia, seek review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing their appeal from an * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief.1 We deny the petition. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, the BIA “issues its own decision but relies in part on the [IJ’s] reasoning, we review both decisions.” Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016). We review the agency’s internal relocation determination for substantial evidence. See Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1161 (9th Cir. 2019). Under this standard, findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). We review the agency’s denial of humanitarian asylum for abuse of discretion. Belayneh v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000). The agency does not abuse its discretion if it “hear[s] the claim” and “consider[s] the evidence.” Marcu v. I.N.S., 147 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2017). 1. The agency properly allocated the burden to the government to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. And when evaluating whether the government met its burden, the agency properly considered Betancourt Cano’s 1 Salma Janai Obando Betancourt, Betancourt Cano’s minor daughter, is a beneficiary of Betancourt Cano’s asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). Petitioners do not challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief. Thus, they have forfeited that claim. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). 2 25-667 testimony that, after leaving her abusers, she had lived safely in Bogota, Colombia for several years. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(3), 1208.16(b)(3); Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2003). 2. The BIA did not fail to address Cano’s burden-shifting argument or ignore the reasonableness prong of the internal relocation analysis. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s findings that “DHS met its burden to show that [Betancourt Cano] could safely relocate within Colombia,” and that Betancourt Cano could “safely and reasonably relo