Kambarov v. Quality Counts, Inc.

── Kambarov v. Quality Counts, Inc. ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 17, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RASHID KAMBAROV, No. 25-1390 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-01103-YY v. MEMORANDUM* QUALITY COUNTS, INC., Defendant - Appellee, and FIRST ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND SERVICES CORP., Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Amy M. Baggio, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 15, 2026** Portland, Oregon Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).  Rashid Kambarov appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claim against Quality Counts, Inc., for lack of personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand. We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that it lacks personal jurisdiction. Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc). “[W]here, as here, the motion [to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction] is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts” to survive the motion to dismiss. Global Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We must “take as true all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve all genuine factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists, we apply Oregon’s long-arm statute, which “confers jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process.” Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Or. R. Civ. P. 4L. “Due process … requires that non-resident defendants have sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that exercising jurisdiction would not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207, 2 25-1390 1212 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). We analyze specific personal jurisdiction under a three-part test: (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. Briskin, 135 F.4th at 750–51 (citation omitted). To determine whether a defendant purposefully directed conduct at the forum state, we apply the “effects” test drawn from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984). Under that test, purposeful direction is satisfied “if a defendant: (1) commits an in