United States v. Hansen

── United States v. Hansen ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 17, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-3669 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:18-cr-00229-VC-1 v. MEMORANDUM* GREGORY JOSEPH HANSEN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 15, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: RAWLINSON, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges. Defendant-Appellant Gregory Joseph Hansen appeals the district court’s reimposition of a special condition of supervised release that permits warrantless, suspicionless searches of Hansen’s electronic devices. We have jurisdiction under * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. We review the district court’s decision on whether to invoke judicial estoppel for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ruiz, 73 F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1996). When the defendant properly objected to a special condition of supervised release, as is the case here, we review the district court’s imposition of the condition for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gnirke, 775 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2015). “This standard incorporates ‘considerable deference’ to the district court’s conclusions regarding supervised release conditions.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012)). “Conditions affecting fundamental rights, however, are ‘reviewed carefully.’” Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1089 (quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2007)). 1. The government argues that Hansen’s appeal should be dismissed under the doctrine of judicial estoppel given that Hansen previously agreed to the condition he now challenges.1 But as Hansen properly points out, the government never invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel before the district court. Rather, the 1 The government also suggests that any error in the reimposition of the special condition was invited and therefore waived and unreviewable under the doctrine of invited error. But there is no indication in the record that Hansen introduced the alleged error. Indeed, while Hansen “agreed to the [original] condition by signing the plea agreement, [the record] does not suggest that [Hansen] himself proposed the condition or drafted the language.” See United States v. Magdaleno, 43 F.4th 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 2022). And the government does not make any arguments to the contrary on appeal. Therefore, dismissal under the doctrine of invited error is not warranted. 2 25-3669 government addressed Hansen’s objections to the electronic search condition on the merits, and the district court similarly ruled on the merits when it reimposed the condition. The government has therefore forfeited any claim of judicial estoppel on appeal. See United States v. Robertson, 52 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Issues not presented to the district court cannot generally be raised for the first time on appeal.”); see also United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840,