Michel Hughes v. Benjamin Bright

── Michel Hughes v. Benjamin Bright ── Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas Date: April 16, 2026 Category: General Cite as 2026 Ark. 69 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-23-749 Opinion Delivered: April 16, 2026 MICHEL HUGHES APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 26DR-19-979] V. HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS, JUDGE BENJAMIN BRIGHT APPELLEE DISSENTING OPINION. SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice Without explanation, the court has dismissed this appeal as improvidently granted. This case presents important issues concerning joint custody that we should address, but because of today’s decision, thousands of families across the state have less certainty as to the validity of their joint-custody agreements, many of which may have been working perfectly for years. Also, by granting review, we have forced the parties to spend additional time, money, and energy on this case. Now, that is all for naught. In asking us to review the court of appeals’ decision, Michel Hughes raised two issues. First, the court of appeals erred in green-lighting the circuit court’s conclusion that parents living within fifteen minutes of each other constituted a material change in circumstances that warranted a change to their custody agreement. Second, the court of appeals misapplied the doctrine of inconsistent positions by holding that, because Hughes argued there was a material change in circumstances, she could not appeal the circuit court’s finding of a material change in circumstances, even though the finding was based on factual allegations that she disputed. On the first issue, a fifteen-minute move cannot qualify as a material change in circumstances.1 Such a claim not only undermines the preference for joint custody, but it is also completely unworkable. How should a circuit court decide if parties live fifteen minutes away from each other? Should it consider traffic, weather, or the driving habits of a particular individual? What if there is construction for a year that closes the shortest route and forces the parents to take a different, longer route? Or should the time between the parents’ homes be determined by how the crow flies? If so, how fast does the crow fly? And do we account for headwind or tailwind? We should have kept this case to clarify that a fifteen-minute move is not enough to qualify as a material change in circumstances. The same goes for the court of appeals’ inconsistent-positions analysis. The court of appeals held that because Hughes argued there was a material change in circumstances below, she could not appeal the circuit court’s finding of a material change in circumstances in favor of Benjamin Bright. The court of appeals came to this conclusion even though the circuit court’s order was based on factual allegations that Hughes disputed. In other words, the court of appeals applied the doctrine of inconsistent positions to bar Hughes from arguing that the facts the circuit court relied on were insufficient to find that there had been 1 See Schnick v. Russell, 2022 Ark. App. 212, at 10, 645 S.W.3d 345, 351 (holding that there was a material change in circumstances when one parent moved nine-and-a-half hours away to Omaha, Nebraska); see also Case v. Van Pelt, 2019 Ark. App. 382, at 7, 587 S.W.3d 567, 571 (affirming the circuit court’s decision to dismiss a petition to modify custody when one of the reasons cited was a twenty-five- to thirty-minute move). 2 a material change in circumstance. The court of appeals has a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between factual allegations and legal conclusions.