Henry K. Morrison v. Doug Walley

── Henry K. Morrison v. Doug Walley ── Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama Date: April 10, 2026 Author: Chad Hanson Category: General Rel: April 10, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________ CL-2025-0867 _________________________ Henry K. Morrison v. Doug Walley Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CV-23-902703) HANSON, Judge. This appeal is taken from a summary judgment entered by the Mobile Circuit Court on an ejectment claim asserted by Doug Walley against Henry K. Morrison. In his December 2023 complaint, Walley alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of real property in Mobile CL-2025-0867 County where Morrison had continued to reside, despite having been given notice to vacate, and that Walley was entitled to be placed in immediate possession of the property; according to an exhibit to his complaint, Walley received from Mary L. Dyess a warranty deed to the property indicating a purchase price of $22,000. Morrison answered the complaint, averring, among other things, that Dyess had not held lawful title to the property, and he asserted a third-party complaint against Dyess and Henderson Pippens, whom he alleged had induced him to execute a deed to the property in favor of Dyess instead of an instrument evidencing a mortgage or a lien representing a $5,000 loan. In August 2024, Walley moved for a summary judgment on his claim, supported by a brief and his affidavit, after which Morrison filed a response in opposition, supported by his own affidavit, in which he posited that the deed from him to Dyess had been procured by fraud and that he had lacked the capacity to execute it. Walley moved in February 2025 for the case to be set for trial, noting that no party had demanded a jury trial; however, on March 18, 2025, the circuit court entered an order granting Walley's summary-judgment motion. Morrison filed a notice of appeal as to that order; however, because the third-party claims 2 CL-2025-0867 remained pending, this court entered an order dismissing that appeal, and a second appeal was also dismissed because the circuit court had purported to dismiss the third-party claims before the issuance of this court's certificate of judgment. Finally, on October 3, 2025, on the motion of Walley, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the third-party claims, and Morrison timely appealed to this court on October 10, 2025. In his appellant's brief, Morrison observes that this court is to review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court; that a summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and that the evidence adduced in the trial court is to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. He cites Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Robinette, 57 Ala. App. 697, 331 So. 2d 709 (Civ. App. 1976), for the propositions that a deed is void when the grantor's signature is obtained by fraud involving the nature of the instrument itself and that subsequent purchasers of the property are not protected against such a void instrument. He asserts that his own affidavit regarding the circumstances of his execution of the deed to Dyess amounts to substantial evidenc