Cameron v. Balfour Beatty Construction CA2/6
── Cameron v. Balfour Beatty Construction CA2/6 ──
Court: California Court of Appeal
Date: April 15, 2026
Category: General
Filed 4/15/26 Cameron v. Balfour Beatty Construction CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
MELINA CAMERON, 2d Civ. No. B341877
(Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, 2024CUOE026155)
(Ventura County)
v.
BALFOUR BEATTY
CONSTRUCTION, LLC, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour), and two of its
employees appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion to
compel arbitration of respondent Melina Cameron’s complaint
alleging one cause of action for sexual harassment and nine other
causes of action. Respondent was Balfour’s former employee.
Before she began work, she signed an agreement requiring the
arbitration of disputes relating to her employment.
The trial court concluded that none of the complaint’s 10
causes of action was subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant
to the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and
Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA). (9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402.) “In
general terms, the EFAA renders arbitration agreements
unenforceable at the plaintiff's election in sexual assault and
sexual harassment cases that arise or accrue on or after March 3,
2022, the EFAA's effective date.” (Doe v. Second Street Corp.
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 559 (Doe).)
Appellants contend the EFAA is inapplicable because
respondent failed to adequately state a claim for sexual
harassment. If the EFAA applies to the cause of action for sexual
harassment, appellants argue that the trial court erroneously
denied their motion to compel arbitration as to the other nine
causes of action. We affirm.
Respondent’s Complaint
Respondent’s complaint alleged: respondent is an African-
American woman. In January 2022 she was hired by Balfour “as
an assistant superintendent of a large construction project.”
“During her employment . . . , [she] was subjected to horrific
racial, gender, and sexual harassment[,] . . . racial and gender
discrimination[,] . . . and apparent workplace violence . . . . She
engaged in protected activity by making protected complaints
and was ultimately terminated in retaliation for the same.”
The complaint consisted of 10 causes of action: (1) hostile
work environment sexual harassment under the state Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12900 et
seq.); (2) hostile work environment gender harassment under the
FEHA; (3) hostile work environment race harassment under the
FEHA; (4) gender discrimination under the FEHA; (5) race
discrimination under the FEHA; (6) retaliation for engaging in
protected activity under the FEHA; (7) failure to prevent
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation under the FEHA; (8)
2
whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section
1102.5, subdivision (b); (9) violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act
of 1976 (Civ. Code, § 51.7); and (10) violation of the Tom Bane
Civil Rights Act (id., § 52.1).
The first cause of action for sexual harassment was against
Balfour and its Assistant Senior Superintendent, Joe
Wandolowski, who was respondent’s direct supervisor. The first
cause of action alleged: on May 1, 2023, a safety supervisor
advised Wandolowski “that there was ‘extremely offensive
graffiti’ in the temporary toilets on the site
{# E23 (Nick, ruling section 1 answer 10): quoting a bill or a court opinion works
the way quoting a news article works. Select a passage above and the same panel
opens: the passage goes to the official you choose, with this document's own
address as its source and its own type. #}