Saxon v. Bisignano

── Saxon v. Bisignano ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 15, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DAWN MARIE SAXON, No. 25-467 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-01311-YY v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Youlee Yim You, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted April 13, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: RAWLINSON, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges. Plaintiff-Appellant Dawn Marie Saxon appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1. The administrative law judge (ALJ) did not ignore critical medical evidence when assessing Saxon’s residual functional capacity. The ALJ determined that Saxon was moderately limited in her ability to understand, remember, or apply information, as well as to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, and thus noted the following nonexertional limitations, among others: “[Saxon] is limited to understanding and remembering simple instructions[,] . . . [and] limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and simple work related decisions.” These restrictions are consistent with Saxon’s limitations concerning memory, concentration, persistence, and pace as identified by Michael Leland, Psy.D., CRC (Dr. Leland) and State agency psychological consultant Sheri L. Tomak, Psy.D. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An ALJ’s assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony.”). Nor did the ALJ err in evaluating Dr. Leland’s medical opinion. ALJs are required to evaluate medical opinions for their persuasiveness, considering the opinion’s “supportability” and “consistency” as “the most important factors.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ evaluated the 2 25-467 persuasiveness of Dr. Leland’s opinion based on the extent to which it was supported by objective medical findings and consistent with the evidence in the record, and the ALJ’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791–93 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that an ALJ may discount a medical opinion that lacks explanation); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (reasoning that an ALJ may discount a medical opinion if the expert’s descriptors are vague and fail to specify a claimant’s functional limits). And finally, the ALJ was not required to recontact Dr. Leland to perform a specific functional assessment because the record was sufficient for the ALJ to render a disability determination. 2. The ALJ also did not err in discounting Saxon’s symptom testimony