Humphrey v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

── Humphrey v. Federal Bureau of Investigation ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 15, 2026 Category: General UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DION KIRK HUMPHREY, No. 24-1328 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-00193-SLG District of Alaska, v. Anchorage FEDERAL BUREAU OF ORDER INVESTIGATION and UNITED STATES BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, Defendants - Appellees. Before: W. FLETCHER and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and PITMAN, District Judge.* The Clerk of the Court is directed to issue the amended memorandum disposition, concurrently with this order. Appellant’s motion to clarify or amend the disposition, Dkt. No. 32, is DENIED. * The Honorable Robert Pitman, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.  NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DION KIRK HUMPHREY, No. 24-1328 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-00193-SLG v. AMENDED MEMORANDUM* FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; UNITED STATES BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding Submitted September 19, 2025 Submission Vacated February 26, 2026 Resubmitted March 27, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: W. FLETCHER and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and Pitman, District Judge.*** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Robert Pitman, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.  Dion Kirk Humphrey appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the government. The district court held that Humphrey was precluded from possessing firearms due to a conviction under the Anchorage Municipal Code (“AMC”) that qualified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9); 921(a)(33)(A)–(C). Humphrey argues that because he was convicted of this offense before Congress amended § 921(a)(33)(A) to include convictions under local law, precluding him from possessing firearms would violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. Additionally, he contends that he qualifies for an exception to the general prohibition pursuant to § 921(a)(33)(C). Last, Humphrey argues that prohibiting him from possessing firearms violates his rights under the Second and Fifth Amendments. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the district court. 1. Whether a law violates the ex post facto clause depends on the acts it seeks to criminalize. “To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law