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Neutral Court Opinion Apr 16, 2026

Geoffrey Anderson v. City of Atlanta, Georgia

── Geoffrey Anderson v. City of Atlanta, Georgia ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Date: April 15, 2026 Category: NEW USCA11 Case: 24-13509 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2026 Page: 1 of 10 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-13509 ____________________ MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. Plaintiff, GEOFFREY ANDERSON, PEACH HOSPITALITY OF GEORGIA, LLC., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01280-VMC ____________________ Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ABUDU and TJOFLAT, Cir- cuit Judges. WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge: USCA11 Case: 24-13509 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2026 Page: 2 of 10 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13509 This appeal requires the straightforward application of the First Amendment to a municipal sign ordinance. In 2015, after the Supreme Court decided Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015), the City of Atlanta amended its sign code to remove several content-based provisions. The new code allowed nonconforming signs to remain if they were legal under the earlier code. A state court ruled that a sign operator’s pre-2015 signs were not lawfully nonconforming because they violated the earlier code. When At- lanta attempted to remove the signs, the sign operator, Multimedia Technologies, sought an injunction in the district court on the ground that the earlier code is unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Multimedia and enjoined enforcement of the code. Because the relevant provision of the sign code is content-neutral, we vacate and remand for further proceed- ings. I. BACKGROUND The City of Atlanta adopted a sign code in 1982. Section 16- 28.019 of the 1982 sign code required that signs be permitted before they could be erected. But section 16-28.019(1) exempted “cam- paign signs,” “[m]emorial signs,” and “[b]ulletin boards” from the permitting requirement. The definitions of the exempted signs were content-based. A separate provision, section 16-28.019(7), limited construction of “signs near freeways [and] expressways.” Those limitations applied only to “general advertising sign[s],” which the code defined as “sign[s] which [are] for the purpose of directing attention to a business, profession, product, service, activ- ity, accommodation, attraction or entertainment not principally USCA11 Case: 24-13509 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2026 Page: 3 of 10 24-13509 Opinion of the Court 3 conducted, sold or offered on the premises. The code also clarified that these signs “may also be referred to as off-site signs.” Multimedia Technologies owns and operates two signs at a property owned by Peach Hospitality of Georgia. The signs are ad- jacent to and visible from Interstate 85, just north of downtown Atlanta. These signs were permitted by Atlanta in May 1993 under section 16-28.019. The signs were installed in compliance with the permits, and th
CourtListener · Apr 15, 2026
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