Geoffrey Anderson v. City of Atlanta, Georgia
── Geoffrey Anderson v. City of Atlanta, Georgia ──
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: April 15, 2026
Category: NEW
USCA11 Case: 24-13509 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2026 Page: 1 of 10
FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-13509
____________________
MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Plaintiff,
GEOFFREY ANDERSON,
PEACH HOSPITALITY OF GEORGIA, LLC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01280-VMC
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ABUDU and TJOFLAT, Cir-
cuit Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
USCA11 Case: 24-13509 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2026 Page: 2 of 10
2 Opinion of the Court 24-13509
This appeal requires the straightforward application of the
First Amendment to a municipal sign ordinance. In 2015, after the
Supreme Court decided Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171
(2015), the City of Atlanta amended its sign code to remove several
content-based provisions. The new code allowed nonconforming
signs to remain if they were legal under the earlier code. A state
court ruled that a sign operator’s pre-2015 signs were not lawfully
nonconforming because they violated the earlier code. When At-
lanta attempted to remove the signs, the sign operator, Multimedia
Technologies, sought an injunction in the district court on the
ground that the earlier code is unconstitutional. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Multimedia and enjoined
enforcement of the code. Because the relevant provision of the sign
code is content-neutral, we vacate and remand for further proceed-
ings.
I. BACKGROUND
The City of Atlanta adopted a sign code in 1982. Section 16-
28.019 of the 1982 sign code required that signs be permitted before
they could be erected. But section 16-28.019(1) exempted “cam-
paign signs,” “[m]emorial signs,” and “[b]ulletin boards” from the
permitting requirement. The definitions of the exempted signs
were content-based. A separate provision, section 16-28.019(7),
limited construction of “signs near freeways [and] expressways.”
Those limitations applied only to “general advertising sign[s],”
which the code defined as “sign[s] which [are] for the purpose of
directing attention to a business, profession, product, service, activ-
ity, accommodation, attraction or entertainment not principally
USCA11 Case: 24-13509 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2026 Page: 3 of 10
24-13509 Opinion of the Court 3
conducted, sold or offered on the premises. The code also clarified
that these signs “may also be referred to as off-site signs.”
Multimedia Technologies owns and operates two signs at a
property owned by Peach Hospitality of Georgia. The signs are ad-
jacent to and visible from Interstate 85, just north of downtown
Atlanta. These signs were permitted by Atlanta in May 1993 under
section 16-28.019. The signs were installed in compliance with the
permits, and th
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