United States v. Mass-Soto

── United States v. Mass-Soto ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 09, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF No. 24-893 AMERICA, D.C. No. 4:22-cr-00766-JGZ-AMM-1 Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MEMORANDUM* SANTOS NAUL MASS-SOTO, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Jennifer G. Zipps, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 2, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. After a jury trial, Santos Naul Mass-Soto (Mass) was convicted on one count of reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He was sentenced to * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 27 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Mass appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1. We review for plain error a district court’s failure to order a competency exam sua sponte where, as here, the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 814 (9th Cir. 2008). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he “lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). We have held that whether the district court plainly erred is “ultimately reducible to the question of whether ‘the evidence of incompetence was such that a reasonable judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the defendant’s competence.’” United States v. Dreyer, 705 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1981)). The district court was not faced with such evidence of incompetence. First, no medical evidence suggested that Mass had a mental disease or defect. The only medical information in the record demonstrated that Mass had never been under the care of mental health professionals and did not display symptoms suggesting serious emotional problems. See United States v. Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a defendant will “almost certainly fail” to show plain error without medical evidence indicating incompetency). 2 24-893  Second, although none of Mass’s four successive attorneys affirmatively stated that they believed he was competent, at least three were exposed to Mass’s U visa theory and none moved for a competency hearing. See Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[D]efendant’s counsel is in the best position to evaluate a client’s comprehension of the proceedings.”). In addition, a reasonable judge likely would have interpreted Mass’s strained relationships and evident displeasure with his attorneys—who told him that neither the facts nor the law supported his U visa story—as evidence of frustration, not incompetence. See United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that counsel believed that his client was competent but “just [did not] want to hear what [counsel was] telling him”). Th