Escamilla v. Lara

── Escamilla v. Lara ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 09, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Mr. DANIEL O. ESCAMILLA, No. 24-1816 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 8:23-cv-01071-JAK-ADS v. MEMORANDUM* RICARDO LARA, California Insurance Commissioner and Head of the California Department of Insurance; KIMBERLY KIRCHMEYER, Director of the California Department of Consumer Affairs; DOES, 1- 20, inclusive, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding Submitted January 30, 2026** Before: PAEZ, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Daniel Escamilla (“Escamilla”), proceeding pro se, appeals the district * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). court’s dismissal, under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of his suit for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, against the California Insurance Commissioner (“Commissioner”) and the Director of the California Department of Consumer Affairs (“Director”) in their official capacities. Escamilla’s suit challenges the legality of Assembly Bill No. 2043, a California statute that requires bail fugitive recovery agents to obtain a professional license with the California Department of Insurance (“CDI”) and a $1 million liability insurance policy. See 2022 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 768 (West); Cal. Ins. Code §§ 1800(b)(1), 1802(b)(2)(A). It also challenges CDI’s failure to grant his application for a license under that statute. We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim or for lack of jurisdiction de novo. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2007). We may affirm dismissal “on any basis fairly supported by the record.” Id. While we generally review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, we review de novo whether amendment of the complaint would be futile. In re Cloudera, Inc., 121 F.4th 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2024). We affirm in part and reverse in part. 1. The district court properly dismissed Escamilla’s Second, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action because those claims, as alleged in the First Amended 2 24-1816 Complaint (“FAC”), were not ripe.1 A “claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action were premised upon an injury that had not yet occurred: the denial of Escamilla’s application for a bail fugitive recovery agent license. This alleged injury was contingent upon two future events that might not have happened: Escamilla filing a completed license application and the Commissioner subsequently denying the application. Because the alleged injury to Escamilla when he filed this suit was speculative rather than actual or imminent, the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action were not ripe. See Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d 774, 794 (9th Cir. 2012) (