David Ramirez v. Ryan Thornell

── David Ramirez v. Ryan Thornell ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 09, 2026 Category: General FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DAVID MARTINEZ RAMIREZ, No. 10-99023 Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:97-cv- 01331-JAT v. RYAN THORNELL, Director of OPINION Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding On Remand from the United States Supreme Court Argued and Submitted March 19, 2024 Submission Deferred June 3, 2024 Resubmitted April 1, 2026 San Francisco, California Filed April 9, 2026 Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Marsha S. Berzon, and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges. 2 RAMIREZ V. SHINN Opinion by Judge Sidney R. Thomas; Partial Dissent by Judge Berzon SUMMARY * Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the panel affirmed the district court’s judgment denying David Ramirez’s federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Arizona conviction and death sentence for the murders of his girlfriend and her daughter. In its prior decision, the panel affirmed the district court in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Ramirez’s ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “under § 2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel.” The panel considered on remand what evidence from the state court record is available to support Ramirez’s IAC claim and whether Ramirez demonstrated cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default of his IAC claim under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  RAMIREZ V. SHINN 3 Because the state court did not address Ramirez’s IAC claim on the merits, the panel did not owe any special deference to the state court decision under the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The panel held that when evaluating whether the procedural default of a particular claim should be excused under Martinez, a federal habeas court may consider evidence that was submitted to the state court in accordance with state procedural rules, regardless of the timing of or purpose for submission. The panel held that Ramirez demonstrated “cause” to excuse his procedural default under Martinez. It was undisputed that Arizona law required IAC claims to be raised in collateral proceedings, and that Ramirez’s counsel in the initial state collateral review proceeding was ineffective. But Ramirez did not demonstrate “prejudice.” Examining the properly considered evidence in this case, the panel held that Ramirez cannot overcome the procedural default of his IAC claim because the underlying claim is not “substantial” within the meaning of Martinez. Under Martinez, a “substantial” IAC claim is one that has “some merit” under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to satisfy the Strickland standard, the defendant is required to show “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” In Ramirez’s case, counsel’s performance at sentencing was deficient, but, under Thornell v. Jones, 602 U.S. 154 (2024), and Lee v. Thornell, 118 F.4th 969 (9th Cir. 2024), Ramirez