Sorto-Cruz v. Blanche

── Sorto-Cruz v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 10, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 10 2026 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DIGNA MARINA SORTO-CRUZ; ERIKA No. 25-1683 XIOMARA RAMIREZ-SORTO, Agency Nos. A209-950-000 Petitioners, A209-950-001 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 11, 2026** Portland, Oregon Before: COLLINS and LEE, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.*** Petitioners Digna Marina Sorto-Cruz and her daughter Erika Xiomara Ramirez-Sorto, natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Sorto-Cruz’s application for asylum, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“Torture Convention”).1 We have jurisdiction under § 242(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. See Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the latter standard, “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition. To qualify for asylum, a petitioner must have a well-founded fear of future persecution “committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.” Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) (simplified). Similarly, to establish eligibility for withholding of removal, a petitioner must show past or feared future persecution either by the government or by “persons or organizations which the government is unable or unwilling to control.” Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Sorto-Cruz’s alleged past and feared future persecution arises out of a series of incidents in which gang members attempted to extort her, including one in which a gang member physically attacked her and threatened her. The IJ rejected Sorto-Cruz’s asylum and withholding claims for multiple 1 Ramirez-Sorto did not file a separate application for relief, but was listed as a rider only for purposes of Sorto-Cruz’s asylum application. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that, unlike asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Torture Convention “may not be derivative”). 2 alternative reasons, including that Sorto-Cruz had not shown that the Salvadoran government was “unwilling or unable to control” the source of her past or feared persecution—i.e., the gang members. The IJ specifically noted that, after Sorto- Cruz was attacked by a gang member, Salvadoran police arrested him, and he was prosecuted and fined, and a restraining order was issued against him. The IJ also concluded that, although the police did not pro