Uddin v. Td Ameritrade, Inc.

── Uddin v. Td Ameritrade, Inc. ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 13, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 13 2026 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS SALAH UDDIN, No. 24-5073 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:24-cv-00396-HSG v. MEMORANDUM* TD AMERITRADE, INC., Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 31, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: TALLMAN, NGUYEN, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges. Salah Uddin appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to vacate a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority arbitration award (“Award”) and granting TD Ameritrade, Inc.’s motion to confirm the Award. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing legal questions de novo, see Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors LLC, 913 F.3d 1162, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2019), we * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). affirm. When presented with a motion to confirm an arbitration award, a court “must grant [the motion] unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected.” 9 U.S.C. § 9. “There is nothing malleable about ‘must grant,’ which unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one of the ‘prescribed’ exceptions applies.” Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008). Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court may vacate an arbitration award (1) “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means”; (2) “where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators”; (3) where a party was “prejudiced” by the arbitrators’ “misconduct” or “misbehavior”; or (4) “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Uddin has not shown that there was any “misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.” See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Even assuming arguendo that the arbitrators’ inadvertent failure to record the proceedings, as required by the arbitration agreement, amounts to “misbehavior,” Uddin failed to show that his rights have been prejudiced by the absence of a recording or transcript of the proceedings. Because the “arbitrators’ award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings,” Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (simplified), the mere absence of a record, by itself, is insufficient to show that Uddin failed to 2 “receive[] a fundamentally fair hearing.” Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 840 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2016). Uddin contends that the arbitrators were “repeatedly interrupting, rushing, and pressuring [his] presentation of evidence and arguments” and that one arbitrator told him, as a pro se, to “leave the law to [them].” These contentions are insufficient to show that the arbitrators exceeded the bounds of efficient management of the hearing and instead behaved in a fundamentally unfair manner that prejudiced Uddin’s ability to present his case. Indeed, Uddin has not identified any particular argument or evidence that he was unable to raise as a result of the arbitrators’ conduct. See U