Abdollah Nia v. Bank of America, N.A.

── Abdollah Nia v. Bank of America, N.A. ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 13, 2026 Category: General FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOHAMMAD FARSHAD No. 24-6187 ABDOLLAH NIA, individually, and D.C. No. on behalf of all similarly situated, 3:21-cv-01799- BAS-BJC Plaintiff - Appellant, v. OPINION BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted February 9, 2026 Pasadena, California Filed April 13, 2026 Before: John B. Owens, Lawrence VanDyke, and Holly A. Thomas, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge VanDyke 2 NIA V. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. SUMMARY * International Emergency Economic Powers Act Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Bank of America, the panel held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act foreclosed a suit brought by Mohammad Farshad Abdollah Nia, an Iranian citizen living in the United States, after the Bank closed his account. The Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”), federal regulations promulgated by the Office of Foreign Asset Control, prohibit U.S. financial institutions from providing financial services to “accounts of persons who are ordinarily resident in Iran, except when such persons are not located in Iran.” 31 C.F.R. § 560.320. The Bank’s Consumer Residency Monitoring (“CRM”) policy required accountholders who were citizens of comprehensively sanctioned countries—like Iran—to periodically submit documents to prove that they were not present or permanently resident in sanctioned countries. After the Bank erroneously mixed up whether a residency document counted as permanent or merely temporary proof of residency, Nia’s account was closed. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act’s shield liability provision, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3), states: “No person shall be held liable for or with respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, this * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  NIA V. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 3 chapter, or any regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this chapter.” The panel held that this provision does not excuse liability only for actions compelled by ITSR. Rather, given the Act’s expansive language, the Bank’s CRM policy, built around the demands of the ITSR, fell comfortably within the liability shield’s ambit. Applying a sanctions compliance program based on citizenship may not be compelled by the ITSR, but it is permitted under the Office of Foreign Asset Control’s guidelines, which explicitly allowed the Bank to account for citizenship in a comprehensively sanctioned country in administering its sanctions compliance program. The panel further held that Nia failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact about the Bank’s good faith. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Bank based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act’s liability shield provision. COUNSEL Jason S. Rathod (argued) and Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, Washington, D.C.; Benjamin I. Siminou and Jonna Lothyan, Singleton Schreiber LLP, San Diego, California; David M. Hundley, Hundley Law Group, Chicago, Illinois; for Plaintiff-Appellant. Michael B. Kimberly (argued), Winston & Strawn LLP, Washington, D.C.; Amanda L. Groves and Shawn R. Obi, Winston & Strawn LL