Shanahan v. Ixl Learning, Inc.

── Shanahan v. Ixl Learning, Inc. ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 13, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT GRETCHEN SHANAHAN, on behalf of No. 24-6985 herself and her minor children A.S. and D.C. No. B.S.; AMY WARREN, on behalf of herself 3:24-cv-02724-RFL and her minor child B.W.; KIMBERLY WHITMAN, on behalf of herself and her MEMORANDUM* minor child H.W., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. IXL LEARNING, INC., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Rita F. Lin, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted January 5, 2026 San Francisco, California Before: GOULD, NGUYEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges. Plaintiffs-Appellees, three mothers and their minor children, ER-151–53 brought this putative class action lawsuit against Defendant-Appellant IXL * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Learning, Inc. (“IXL”), an educational technology company that provides software services that form part of Plaintiffs’ children’s school curriculum. Plaintiffs allege that IXL collected and monetized their and their children’s data without consent. IXL moved to compel arbitration, pointing to an arbitration clause in its terms of service (“Terms”). IXL shared these Terms with Plaintiffs’ school districts, but there is no evidence that the Terms were shared with or expressly consented to by Plaintiffs. The district court denied the motion, and IXL timely appealed. In deciding a motion to compel arbitration, “[t]he FAA limits the role of the judiciary ‘to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.’” Johnson v. Walmart, Inc., 57 F.4th 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). “‘[W]hile doubts concerning the scope of an arbitration clause should be resolved in favor or arbitration, the presumption does not apply to disputes concerning whether an agreement to arbitrate has been made.’” Id. at 680–81 (quoting Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 743 (9th Cir. 2014)). Courts apply “the summary judgment standard of Rule 56” when determining whether an agreement to arbitrate was made. Hansen v. LMB Mortg. Servs., Inc., 1 F.4th 667, 670 (9th Cir. 2021). “[T]he party seeking to compel arbitration . . . bears the burden of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence.” Johnson, 2 24-6985 57 F.4th at 681. “[O]nce a district court concludes that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the parties formed an arbitration agreement, the court must proceed without delay to a trial on arbitrability.” Hansen, 1 F.4th at 672. “Only when there is no genuine issue of fact concerning the formation of the agreement should the court decide as a matter of law that the parties did or did not enter into such an agreement.” Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1980), abrogated in part on other grounds by First Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995), as recognized in Aliments Krispy Kernels, Inc. v. Nic