United States v. Manuel Zumba Mejia

── United States v. Manuel Zumba Mejia ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Date: April 09, 2026 Category: General 24-3086-cr United States of America v. Manuel Zumba Mejia 1 In the 2 United States Court of Appeals 3 for the Second Circuit 4 ________ 5 AUGUST TERM 2025 6 No. 24-3086-cr 7 8 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 9 Appellant, 10 11 v. 12 13 MANUEL ZUMBA MEJIA, 14 Defendant-Appellee. 15 ________ 16 17 Appeal from the United States District Court for the 18 Southern District of New York 19 ________ 20 21 ARGUED: FEBRUARY 10, 2026 22 DECIDED: APRIL 9, 2026 23 ________ 24 25 Before: CABRANES, SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges, and GONZALEZ, District 26 Judge. * 27 *Judge Hector Gonzalez, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 1  1 ________ 2 The United States of America appeals from an October 29, 2024 3 order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 4 New York (Vincent L. Briccetti, Judge) granting Defendant-Appellee 5 Manuel Zumba Mejia’s motion to dismiss a criminal information. The 6 Government filed a timely notice of appeal on November 25, 2024, 7 invoking this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 8 The Government charged Mejia by complaint with aggravated 9 illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). Section 10 1326(d), in turn, provides that a defendant charged with illegal reentry 11 “may not challenge the validity of” his prior deportation order 12 “unless” that defendant satisfies three statutory requirements. Relying 13 on the law of the Circuit established in United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 14 131 (2d. Cir. 2004), the District Court first held that Mejia’s original 15 deportation proceeding was fundamentally unfair under § 1326(d)(3) 16 because the immigration judge misled him in violation of due process 17 by incorrectly stating he was ineligible for voluntary departure. The 18 District Court then concluded that Mejia had effectively satisfied 19 §§ 1326(d)(1) and (2) because his failure to appeal resulted from the 20 immigration judge’s misleading statements, rendering his waiver of 21 appeal not knowing and intelligent. 22 The Supreme Court has settled this matter otherwise, holding 23 unanimously in United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321 (2021), 24 that § 1326(d)’s requirements are “mandatory,” and that “a court may 25 not excuse a failure to exhaust,” id. at 326, 329. This holding squarely 26 abrogates our prior rule under Sosa and its progeny, which had 2  1 permitted defendants to bypass § 1326(d)’s exhaustion and 2 deprivation-of-judicial-review requirements. Bound as we are by the 3 judgments of the Supreme Court, we hold that Mejia was barred from 4 collaterally challenging his underlying removal order because he 5 failed to satisfy those requirements, and the statute does not permit a 6 court to excuse that failure. 7 Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting 8 Mejia’s motion to dismiss and REMAND for further proceedings 9 consistent with this opinion. 10 ________ 11 MICHAEL D. MAIMIN (Jorja N. 12 Knauer, on the brief), Assistant 13