Rhodes-Hamby v. Askew

── Rhodes-Hamby v. Askew ── Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona Date: April 10, 2026 Category: General NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE WILLIAM RHODES-HAMBY, Petitioner, v. ANYA ASKEW, Respondent. No. 1 CA-SA 26-0064 FILED 04-10-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County No. DO2021-00049 The Honorable Ted S. Reed, Judge JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED COUNSEL Berkshire Law Office, PLLC, Tempe By Keith Berkshire, Alexandra Sandlin, Elizabeth Nañez, Alicia Derr Counsel for Petitioner Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff By Chad Joshua Winger Counsel for Respondent  RHODES-HAMBY v. ASKEW Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined. J A C O B S, Judge: ¶1 William Rhodes-Hamby (“Father”) asks us to exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction to review the superior court’s temporary order granting Anya Askew (“Mother”) temporary sole legal decision-making authority and near-exclusive parenting time. He first argues that despite Mother’s previous acts of domestic violence, the temporary order fails to cite evidence rebutting the statutory presumption that awarding sole legal decision-making authority and exclusive parenting time to Mother is contrary to the child’s best interests. See A.R.S. § 25- 403.03(D). Father then argues the court’s temporary order improperly allows the court-appointed therapist to determine the frequency and duration of his exercise of parenting time. ¶2 We exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction because questions relating to the well-being of children are of statewide importance and the harm complained of can only be prevented by resolution before an appeal. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(4), (6). We grant relief and vacate the superior court’s temporary order because we agree with Father that the court erred by not following the statutory framework set forth in A.R.S. § 25-403.03 and by delegating its judicial decision-making authority to the court-appointed therapist. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Father Obtains an Order of Protection Against Mother for Domestic Violence, and Mother and Father Divorce. ¶3 Father and Mother married in March 2019 and had one child born in September 2019. Father filed for divorce in February 2021. Before the divorce was final, Father sought an order of protection against Mother based on allegations of domestic violence. In December 2022, the court issued a two-year order of protection prohibiting Mother from contacting Father, finding “reasonable cause to believe that [Mother] may commit an 2  RHODES-HAMBY v. ASKEW Decision of the Court act of domestic violence or has committed an act of domestic violence within the past year.” ¶4 Mother and Father were divorced in February 2024. Their consent decree kept the order of protection in effect, awarded Mother and Father joint legal decision-making, and gave Father final legal decision- making authority. In a separate order, the court awarded Mother and Father equal parenting time. B. Father Obtains a Second Order of Protection Against Mother Because of a Criminal Trespass Conviction. ¶5 In May 2024, Mother was found guilty of criminal t