Dries v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.

── Dries v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. ── Case No.: 25-925 Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Date: April 03, 2026 Category: General 25-925 Dries v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of April, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ DANNY DRIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 25-925 SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., Defendant-Appellee. _____________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: James V. Sabatini, Sabatini and Associates, LLC, Newington, CT. For Defendant-Appellee: Paula N. Anthony, Littler Mendelson, P.C., New Haven, CT. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Stefan R. Underhill, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the March 17, 2025 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Danny Dries appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Smith & Nephew, Inc., on his claim that Smith & Nephew retaliated against him for attempting to exercise his right to take paternity leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, see Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2021), and will affirm only when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision. 2  In analyzing FMLA retaliation claims, courts apply the three-part burden- shifting test first set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). That test first requires a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that (i) he exercised his rights under the FMLA; (ii) he was qualified for the position; (iii) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (iv) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of retaliatory intent. See Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying McDonnell Douglas test to FMLA retaliation claim). If the plaintiff can make out a prima facie case at step one, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions. Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 429 (2d Cir. 2016). Where the employer carries that burden at step two, the plaintiff must then prove that the reasons the employer offered were a pretext for retaliation. See id. The parties agree that Dries’s claims rise and fall with this final question, compare Dries Br. at 29, with Smith & Neph