United States v. Aguayo-Montes

── United States v. Aguayo-Montes ── Case No.: 24-4073 Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Date: March 17, 2026 Category: General Appellate Case: 24-4073 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 17, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 24-4073 CESAR AGUAYO-MONTES, Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah (D.C. No. 4:23-CV-00045-DN and 4:21-CR-00069-DN-1) _________________________________ Benjamin C. McMurray, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Scott Keith Wilson, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. Briggs J. Matheson, Assistant United States Attorney (Felice John Viti, Acting United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. _________________________________ Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, KELLY and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ MORITZ, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ Before Cesar Aguayo-Montes (Aguayo) pleaded guilty to a drug charge, he asked his attorney about the impact it would have on his immigration status. Aguayo had lived in Colorado for as long as he could remember, so he was concerned about a line in the plea agreement warning that he “may” be removed. Counsel said he  Appellate Case: 24-4073 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 2 couldn’t tell Aguayo what would happen but that Aguayo didn’t need to worry about it until he got to prison. Acting on that advice, Aguayo agreed to plead guilty to possessing heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), a controlled-substance offense that made his deportation practically inevitable. After learning that his plea had all but sealed his immigration fate, Aguayo filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. He alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his attorney’s advice on the immigration consequences of his plea fell below the standard set in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The district court denied the motion, explaining that Aguayo couldn’t succeed on his challenge because he knew all he was entitled to know—that his plea exposed him to a risk of deportation. Aguayo appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas motion. We conclude that Padilla compels a different result. When the immigration consequences of a conviction are “truly clear,” as they were here, “the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.” Id. at 369. As such, Aguayo’s counsel should have advised him that his deportation would be “automatic,” “presumptively mandatory,” or “practically inevitable.” Id. at 360, 363–64, 368–69. On the facts we have before us, he did not do so. We thus reverse and remand for further proceedings. Background Aguayo’s parents brought him to the United States when he was two years old, and he has lived in Colorado ever since. At age 16, he received immigration relief under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, which grants renewable