United States v. Jackson

── United States v. Jackson ── Case No.: 25-5037 Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Date: April 03, 2026 Category: General Appellate Case: 25-5037 Document: 41 Date Filed: 04/03/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 3, 2026 _______________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 25-5037 (D.C. No. 4:24-CR-00140-JFJ-1) CORY LAMAR JACKSON, (N.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _______________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _______________________________________ Before BACHARACH, MORITZ, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _______________________________________ This appeal involves the constitutionality of a search while Mr. Cory Jackson was driving a rented SUV. Inside the SUV were roughly five pounds of cocaine, which led the government to prosecute Mr. Jackson for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii)(II). Mr. Jackson unsuccessfully moved to suppress the * The parties waived oral argument, so we’re considering this appeal based on the briefs. This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).  Appellate Case: 25-5037 Document: 41 Date Filed: 04/03/2026 Page: 2 evidence from the search and appeals the district court’s ruling. The appeal turns on whether probable cause existed for the search. Probable cause existed if a fair probability existed for law enforcement to find contraband in the SUV. United States v. Saulsberry, 878 F.3d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 2017). For this inquiry, we credit the district court’s factual findings 1 unless they’re clearly erroneous. United States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1062 (10th Cir. 2006). But Mr. Jackson doesn’t argue that the underlying findings were clearly erroneous. He instead argues that the findings don’t create probable cause. That argument triggers de novo review. United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1152 (10th Cir. 2004). The district court relied in part on testimony that the officer had smelled burnt marijuana in the SUV. R. vol. 3, at 13. The smell alone 1 The district court said that the investigating officer had testified about various factors contributing to probable cause. R. vol. 1, at 72. The recitation of testimony does not ordinarily constitute a factual finding. Rep. Tech. Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540, 548 n.7 (2d Cir. 1973). But the court said that it was finding probable cause based on the officer ’s testimony. R. vol. 1, at 72. So the district court apparently intended to credit the officer ’s testimony for purposes of the findings. See United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1393 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976) (“Although the findings are cast as a summary of each witness’ testimony, it is clear that the district court found the facts stated to be true.”); see also Kinney ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Int’l Union of Oper. Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 994 F.2d 1271, 1274 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) (treating the district court’s restatement of testimony as findings consisting of the adoption of that testimony “as an accurate reflection of what hap