Walsh v. HNTB Corporation

── Walsh v. HNTB Corporation ── Case No.: 24-1499 Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Date: March 13, 2026 Category: General United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 24-1499 JOANNE WALSH, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. HNTB CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] Before Montecalvo, Rikelman, and Aframe Circuit Judges. Michaela C. May, with whom Zachary H. Hammond and Bennett & Belfort, P.C. were on brief, for appellant. Mark C. Tatum, with whom Stephen I. Hansen and Shook, Hardy & Bacon were on brief, for appellee. March 13, 2026  AFRAME, Circuit Judge. Joanne Walsh worked for many years as an information technology ("IT") employee for HNTB Corporation in its Boston, Massachusetts office. In August 2019, the company placed Walsh on a three-month performance improvement plan ("PIP") that she successfully completed. About ten months later, Walsh resigned. She then sued HNTB alleging, inter alia, that the company committed unlawful age discrimination, primarily by placing her on the PIP and then constructively discharging her. The district court granted HNTB summary judgment on the grounds that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the PIP constituted an adverse employment action or that Walsh resigned in circumstances that constituted a constructive discharge. Walsh appealed. In response, HNTB challenged the timeliness of the appeal and defended the judgment on the merits. We conclude that the appeal is timely and affirm the judgment. I. We start with the timeliness issue. HNTB contends that we cannot hear this appeal because Walsh belatedly filed her notice of appeal. We describe the relevant procedural facts and then explain why Walsh's appeal is timely. On December 21, 2023, the district court granted summary judgment for HNTB. Following the judgment, Walsh's trial counsel stopped the representation. On January 19, 2024, within the thirty-day period to file an appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. - 2 - R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), Walsh moved pro se to extend the notice-of-appeal deadline because she needed more time to find new counsel. The court granted that motion and allowed Walsh until March 29, 2024, to file her notice of appeal. Walsh subsequently asked for two more extensions, each of which the court granted. She filed her formal notice of appeal on May 15, 2024. The crux of HNTB's argument is that Walsh's January 19 motion to extend the notice of appeal deadline was her only timely extension request under 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure ("Rule") 4. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). According to HNTB, since Walsh did not file a notice of appeal within the additional time granted pursuant to that request, her May 15 notice of appeal was ineffective. Walsh responds that we should treat her January 19 motion as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal and thus deem her appeal timely. We agree with Walsh. Rule 3(c) requires a notice of appeal to contain three pieces of information, which we soon will detail. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). The Rule also cautions that "[a]n appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal." Id. at 3(c)(7). Based in part on this latter provision, courts "liberally construe" Rule 3. Smith v. Barry,