Tommy James Rumph v. State of Alaska

── Tommy James Rumph v. State of Alaska ── Case No.: A13952 Court: Court of Appeals of Alaska Date: March 13, 2026 Category: General NOTICE The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts: 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501 Fax: (907) 264-0878 E-mail: [email protected] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA TOMMY JAMES RUMPH, Court of Appeals No. A-13952 Appellant, Trial Court No. 3AN-16-07493 CR v. OPINION STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee. No. 2826 — March 13, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Catherine M. Easter, Judge. Appearances: Michael L. Barber, Barber Law Services, Boston, Massachusetts, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges. Judge WOLLENBERG.  Tommy James Rumph was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder for shooting and killing Treavonne Owens.1 He was also convicted of third-degree misconduct involving weapons and fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance arising out of the same incident. 2 Rumph appeals his convictions, raising several challenges. First, Rumph argues that the superior court made two erroneous evidentiary rulings — one precluding him from introducing a statement he made to his girlfriend in the aftermath of the shooting and a second precluding him from introducing evidence that Owens had a reputation for carrying a weapon. The court found that the first statement was hearsay and that “carrying a weapon” is not a character trait for purposes of admission under Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b). Having reviewed the trial record, we conclude that, to the extent there were any errors in these rulings, these errors were harmless. Next, Rumph challenges the denial of his motion for a new trial. Following the verdict, one of the jurors sent Rumph’s attorney an email expressing concerns about the jury’s deliberations. The juror subsequently provided an affidavit to Rumph’s attorney setting forth several allegations. Based on the contents of this affidavit, Rumph moved for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was tainted by racial bias and that the jurors had improperly considered extraneous information — in particular, knowledge gleaned from another juror’s acquaintance with one of the defense witnesses and the costs associated with a potential hung jury. Rumph argued that the general rule set out in Alaska Evidence Rule 606(b) precluding inquiry into jury deliberations had to give way to consideration of the information brought forth in the juror’s post-trial affidavit. Rumph relied on the 1 AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A). 2 AS 11.61.200(a)(1) and former AS 11.71.050(a)(4) (September 2016 version), respectively. –2– 2826 United States Supreme Court’s decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, which recognized a constitutionally based exception to the no-impeachment rule for “statements exhibiting overt racial bias,”3 and the statutory exception in Evidence Rule 606(b) for extraneous information improperly brought to the jury’s attention. The superior court concluded that none of the exceptions to the general bar on impeachment relied on by Ru