Alabama State Employees Credit Union v. Trevor Spencer

── Alabama State Employees Credit Union v. Trevor Spencer ── Case No.: CL-2025-1018 Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama Date: March 27, 2026 Author: Moore Category: General Rel: March 27, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________ CL-2025-1018 _________________________ Alabama State Employees Credit Union v. Trevor Spencer Appeal from Lee Circuit Court (CV-25-900129) MOORE, Presiding Judge. On June 27, 2025, the Lee Circuit Court entered a default judgment in favor of the Alabama State Employees Credit Union ("ASECU") in a breach-of-contract action it had commenced against Trevor Spencer. The default judgment provided, in pertinent part: CL-2025-1018 "A default judgment for $24,086.85 plus court costs is entered in favor of [ASECU] and against [Spencer]. Post-judgment interest shall accrue at the legal rate of 7.50% per year or at the contract rate (whichever is lower) on the unpaid portion of the Judgment." (Bold typeface and capitalization omitted.) ASECU timely filed, pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., a postjudgment motion requesting that the circuit court delete from the judgment the provision relating to postjudgment interest. ASECU argued that, under Ala. Code 1975, § 8- 8-10, it was entitled to postjudgment interest of 17.5% as established in its contract with Spencer. The circuit court allowed the postjudgment motion to be denied by operation of law, see Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., and ASECU timely appealed. On December 19, 2025, after ASECU had appealed, the circuit court, on its own motion, decided to treat the Rule 59 postjudgment motion as a motion for relief from the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. The circuit court entered an order purporting to amend the default judgment to provide, in pertinent part: "Post- judgment interest shall accrue at the statutory rate as defined by § 8-8- 10 of the Code of Alabama (1975)." However, that order was a nullity. Once the Rule 59 postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law, 2 CL-2025-1018 the circuit court lost jurisdiction to rule upon it. See Smith v. Smith, 4 So. 3d 1178 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). The circuit court did not have the authority under Rule 60(b)(6) to revive the postjudgment motion without ASECU's requesting relief from the default judgment. "Rule 60(b) requires that a party move for relief from a judgment, and does not provide for sua sponte relief by the trial court." Ex parte P&H Constr. Co., 723 So. 2d 45, 49 (Ala. 1998). A circuit court may, on its own motion, vacate a void judgment, see K.M.D. v. T.N.B., 227 So. 3d 512 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017), but the circuit court did not vacate the judgment because it was void; the circuit court improperly purported to amend the judgment to correct what it perceived to be a legal error. That amendment being ineffective, the original default judgment stands. On appeal, ASECU argues that the provision in the default judgment addressing postjudgment interest is erroneous and void. We agree that the circuit court erred in limiting postjudgment interest to the statutory interest rate of 7.5%, but we conclude that that error did not make the postjudgment-interest-rate provision void. Section 8-8-10(a) provides, in pertinent part: "Judgments for the payment of money,