Phillip Duke v. Walmart, Inc., and Qeon Gray

── Phillip Duke v. Walmart, Inc., and Qeon Gray ── Case No.: SC-2026-0074 Court: Supreme Court of Alabama Date: March 20, 2026 Author: Sellers Category: General Rel: March 20, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________ SC-2026-0074 _________________________ Phillip Duke v. Walmart, Inc., and Qeon Gray Appeal from Pike Circuit Court (CV-24-900152) SELLERS, Justice.1 1This case was originally assigned to another Justice on this Court; it was reassigned to Justice Sellers on February 23, 2026. SC-2026-0074 Phillip Duke appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Pike Circuit Court ("the trial court") in favor of Walmart, Inc., and its employee, Qeon Gray, on Duke's tort claims against Walmart and Gray. We affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History On October 2, 2024, at or around 9:46 p.m., Duke, who claims that he was "off duty" and jogging in the parking lot of the Walmart distribution center, was struck by a tractor-trailer truck being driven by Gray. It is undisputed that, at the time of the accident, both Duke and Gray were employed by Walmart and that Gray was performing a job- related duty. On December 12, 2024, Duke commenced an action against Walmart and Gray, seeking damages for the injuries he incurred as a result of the accident. In his complaint, Duke asserted certain tort claims against Walmart and Gray.2 Walmart answered the complaint, asserting as an affirmative defense that Duke's tort claims were barred by § 25-5- 52 and § 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, which are commonly referred to as the 2Duke asserted claims of negligence; wantonness; negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; he asserted theories of liability premised on the doctrine of respondeat superior, agency, and co-employee liability under § 25-5-11, Ala. Code 1975. 2 SC-2026-0074 exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-1, et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Walmart and Gray thereafter moved for a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., based on the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Walmart and Gray. In its judgment, the trial court noted that it was undisputed that Duke had accepted workers' compensation and medical benefits from Walmart, that he had accepted those benefits while represented by counsel, and that he had taken no action to reserve any right to pursue any other remedy before accepting those benefits. Thus, the trial court held that Duke's acceptance of the workers' compensation benefits while represented by counsel estopped him from pursuing other remedies against Walmart. The trial court further noted that Duke's claims against Gray were insufficient because, it said, there was no evidence of willful conduct. This appeal followed. II. Standard of Review "This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo, and we use the same standard used by the trial court to determine whether the evidence presented to the trial court presents a genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Nettles v. Pettway, 306 So. 3d 873 (Ala. 2020). The movant for a summary judgment has the initial burden of producing