Don Lippert v. Latoya Hughes

── Don Lippert v. Latoya Hughes ── Case No.: 24-1998 Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Date: April 02, 2026 Category: General In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 DON LIPPERT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LATOYA HUGHES, et al., Defendants-Appellants. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:10-cv-4603 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED NOVEMBER 13, 2025 — DECIDED APRIL 2, 2026 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK, LEE, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges. LEE, Circuit Judge. A class of prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections sued the department’s di- rector, its director of health services, and the governor of Illi- nois in their official capacities (collectively, “IDOC”) for providing inadequate medical and dental care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The class was subsequently certified, and the parties settled the case and agreed to the entry of a 2 Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 consent decree, which, among other things, required IDOC to create an implementation plan to rectify the systemic deficien- cies identified in the decree. After several years of protracted litigation, the district court approved an implementation plan that was incorporated into the consent decree. As time went on, IDOC filed several motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) asking the district court to modify the consent decree in various ways. In turn, Plaintiffs filed a motion to ex- tend the consent decree beyond the original expiration date. IDOC appealed the various rulings that went against it in two separate appeals, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed (the cross-ap- peal was subsequently dismissed). One notable issue IDOC raises is whether the district court, having already approved the implementation plan, must make certain findings re- quired by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), before enforcing any of its provi- sions. IDOC argues that this is the case, presumably believing that the district court’s various orders leave this question in doubt. But, as we read this record, the district court in fact agreed with IDOC on this issue. Turning then to IDOC’s two appeals, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to address cer- tain issues raised in the first appeal and affirm the remainder. I The certified class consists of IDOC prisoners with serious medical and dental needs. They sued IDOC, alleging that it failed to provide necessary medical and dental care in viola- tion of the Eighth Amendment. Eventually, the parties arrived at a settlement and agreed to the entry of a consent decree; the district court approved the consent decree in 2019 and amended it in 2022. Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 3 Its purpose, the consent decree states, is to ensure that IDOC “implements sufficient measures … to provide ade- quate medical and dental care to those incarcerated in the Il- linois Department of Corrections with serious medical or den- tal needs while ensuring the availability of necessary services, supports and other resources to meet these needs.” As part of the consent decree, the parties also stipulated that it “com- plies in all respects with … 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).” To achieve its broad purpose, the consent decree laid out a host of requirements and standards that IDOC had to meet in providing health and dental services. Rather than mandat- ing specific detailed actions, however, the consent decree im- posed rather general benchmarks and goals such as: provid- ing “access to an appropriate level of primary, secondary, and tertiary care”; “implement[ing] changes in …